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We study a class of continuous-time reputation games between a large player and a
population of small players in which the actions of the large player are imperfectly observable.
The large player is either a normal type, who behaves strategically, or a behavioral type, who
is committed to playing a certain strategy. We provide a complete characterization of the set
of sequential equilibrium payoﬀs of the large player using an ordinary diﬀerential equation.
In addition, we identify a suﬃcient condition for the sequential equilibrium to be unique and
Markovian in the small players’ posterior belief. An implication of our characterization is
that when the small players are certain that they are facing the normal type, intertemporal
incentives are trivial: the set of equilibrium payoﬀs of the large player coincides with the
convex hull of the set of static Nash equilibrium payoﬀs.
1 Introduction.
Reputation plays an important role in long-run relationships. A ﬁrm, for instance, can beneﬁt
from reputation to ﬁght potential entrants, to provide high quality to consumers, or to generate
good returns to investors. Governments can beneﬁt from commitment to non-inﬂationary mon-
etary policy, low capital taxation and eﬀorts to ﬁght corruption. Sometimes, bad reputation can
also create perverse incentives that lead to market breakdown. In this paper, we study reputa-
tion dynamics in a repeated game between a large player and a population of small players in
which the actions of the large player are imperfectly observable. For example, the quality of a
ﬁrm’s products may be a noisy outcome of a ﬁrm’s hidden eﬀort to maintain quality standards.
The inﬂation rate can be a noisy signal of money supply.
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1Our setting is a continuous-time analogue of the repeated game of Fudenberg and Levine
(1992), hereafter FL. In the class of games that we study, the public signals about the large
player’s actions are distorted by a Brownian motion. The small players are anonymous, that
is, the public information includes the aggregate distribution of the small players’ actions but
not the actions of any individual small player. Hence, as in FL, the small players behave
myopically in every equilibrium, acting to maximize their instantaneous expected payoﬀs. We
model reputation assuming that the large player can be either a normal type, who behaves
strategically, or a behavioral type, who is committed to playing a certain strategy. The reputation
of the large player is interpreted as the posterior probability the small players assign to the
behavioral type.
Discrete-time methods oﬀer two main limit results about reputation games. First, FL show
that when the large player gets patient, in every equilibrium his payoﬀ becomes at least as high
as the commitment payoﬀ, which is the payoﬀ he would receive if he could credibly commit to
the strategy of the behavioral type. Second, Cripps, Mailath, and Samuelson (2004) show that
reputation eﬀects are temporary: in any equilibrium, the type of the large player is gradually
revealed in the long run. Apart from these two limits, not much is known about equilibrium
behavior in reputation games, particularly when actions are imperfectly observable. The explicit
construction of even one sequential equilibrium appears to be a hard problem.
In our continuous-time framework we are able to provide a complete characterization of
the set of sequential equilibrium payoﬀs of the large player for any ﬁxed discount rate. The
characterization is in terms of an ordinary diﬀerential equation. We also identify an interesting
class of reputation games that have a unique sequential equilibrium, which is Markovian in
the large player’s reputation. In a Markov perfect equilibrium (see Maskin and Tirole (2001))
behavior is determined by the small players’ posterior belief, the payoﬀ-relevant state variable.
The main suﬃcient condition for uniqueness is expressed in terms of a family of auxiliary one-
shot games in which the payoﬀs of the large player are adjusted by suitably deﬁned “reputational
weights.” We show that whenever these auxiliary one-shot games have unique Bayesian Nash
equilibria, the reputation game will have a unique sequential equilibrium, which is Markovian
and continuous in the small players’ posterior belief.
We then examine how the large player’s reputation aﬀects his equilibrium payoﬀs and incen-
tives. Under our suﬃcient condition for uniqueness, we show that whenever the large player’s
static Bayesian Nash equilibrium payoﬀ increases in reputation, his sequential equilibrium payoﬀ
in the repeated game also increases in reputation. In this case, reputation is good. The normal
type of large player beneﬁts from imitating the behavioral type and building his reputation, but
in equilibrium this imitation is necessarily imperfect: if it were perfect, the public signals would
be uninformative about the large player’s type, so imitation would have no value. The normal
type obtains his maximum payoﬀ when the small players are certain that they are facing the
behavioral type. In this extreme case the population’s beliefs never change and the normal type
“gets away” with any action.
We also extend our characterization to general environments with multiple sequential equi-
libria. Consider the correspondence of sequential equilibrium payoﬀs of the large player as a
function of the small players’ prior belief. We show that this correspondence is convex-valued
2and that its upper boundary is the maximal solution of a diﬀerential inclusion (see, e.g., Aubin
and Cellina (1984)), with an analogous characterization for the lower boundary.
One implication of our characterization is that when reputation eﬀects are absent (i.e., when
the small players are certain that they are facing the normal type), the large player cannot attain
better payoﬀs than in static Nash equilibrium (Theorem 2). This result has no counterpart in
the discrete-time setting of FL, where non-trivial equilibria of the complete information game are
known to exist (albeit with payoﬀs bounded away from eﬃciency). Our equilibrium degeneracy
result reﬂects the fact that discrete-time intertemporal incentives break down when the large
player is able to respond to public information quickly. In the best discrete-time equilibrium,
the large player’s incentives arise from the threat of a punishment phase, which is triggered
when the signal about his actions is suﬃciently bad. The intuition from Abreu, Milgrom, and
Pearce (1991), who study discrete-time games in the limit as actions become more frequent,
explains why such incentives unravel. In games with frequent actions, the information that
players observe within each time period becomes excessively noisy, and so the statistical tests
that trigger the punishment regimes produce false positives too often. This eﬀect is especially
strong when information arrives continuously via a Brownian motion, as shown in Sannikov and
Skrzypacz (2006a) for discrete-time games with frequent actions.1 We carry out our arguments
directly in continuous time.
The Markovian property of reputational equilibria is connected to the collapse of intertem-
poral incentives in the repeated game without reputation eﬀects. When the static game has a
unique Nash equilibrium, the only equilibrium of the continuous-time game without reputation
is the repetition of the static Nash equilibrium, which is trivially Markovian. In our setting,
continuous time prevents non-Markovian incentives created by rewards and punishments from
enhancing the incentives naturally created by reputation dynamics.
We conclude the introduction by discussing the related literature. The asymmetric infor-
mation approach to reputations was introduced in the early papers of Kreps and Wilson (1982)
and Milgrom and Roberts (1982), who analyze the chain store paradox, and Kreps, Milgrom,
Roberts, and Wilson (1982), who study cooperation in the ﬁnitely repeated prisoners’ dilemma.
Arbitrarily small amounts of incomplete information (in the form of behavioral types) give rise
to behaviors that cannot be supported by the equilibria of the underlying complete informa-
tion games: entry deterrence in the chain store game and cooperation in the ﬁnitely repeated
prisoners’ dilemma.
FL study payoﬀ bounds from reputation eﬀects in repeated games in which the actions of
the long-run player are imperfectly observable. FL show that when the set of behavioral types
is suﬃciently rich and the monitoring technology satisﬁes a statistical identiﬁcation condition,
the upper and lower bounds coincide with the long-run player’s Stackelberg payoﬀ, that is, the
payoﬀ he obtains from credibly committing to the strategy to which he would like to commit
the most. A related paper, Faingold (2006), extends the Fudenberg-Levine payoﬀ bounds to a
class of continuous-time games that includes the games we study in this paper. In addition,
Faingold (2006) shows that such payoﬀ bounds also hold for discrete-time games with frequent
1See also the more recent studies of Fudenberg and Levine (2006) and Sannikov and Skrzypacz (2006b) into
the qualitative diﬀerences between Poisson and Brownian information.
3actions uniformly in the period length.
We use methods related to those of Sannikov (2006a) and Sannikov (2006b) to derive the
connection between the large player’s incentives and the law of motion of the large player’s
continuation value, which forms a part of the recursive structure of our games. The other part,
which is new to our paper, comes from the evolution of the posterior beliefs. The consistency
and sequential rationality conditions for sequential equilibria are formulated in terms of these
two variables.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our leading example. Section 3 in-
troduces the continuous-time model. Section 4 provides a recursive characterization of public
sequential equilibria. Section 5 examines the underlying complete information game. Section 6
provides the ODE characterization when equilibrium is unique. Section 7 extends the charac-
terization to games with multiple equilibria.
2 Example: The Game of Quality Standards.
Consider a monopolist who provides a service to a continuum of identical consumers. At each
time t ∈ [0,∞), the monopolist chooses a level of investment in quality, at ∈ [0,1], and each
consumer i ∈ I ≡ [0,1] chooses a service level, bi
t ∈ [0,3]. The monopolist does not observe
each consumer individually, but only the average level of service, ¯ bt, over the population of
consumers. Likewise, the consumers do not observe the monopolist’s investment. Instead, they
publicly observe the quality of the service, dXt, which is a noisy signal of the monopolist’s
investment:
dXt = at(4 −¯ bt) dt + (4 −¯ bt) dZt ,
where (Zt)t≥0 is a standard Brownian motion. The drift, at(4−¯ bt), is the expected quality ﬂow
at time t, and 4 −¯ bt is the magnitude of the noise. Hence, the technology features a congestion
eﬀect: the expected quality ﬂow per customer deteriorates with greater usage. Note that the
noise also decreases with usage: the more customers use the service the better they learn its
quality.
The unit price for the service is exogenously ﬁxed and normalized to unity. The overall





t dXt − bi
t dt),
where r > 0 is a discount rate. We emphasize that in equilibrium the consumers behave
myopically, that is, they act to maximize their expected ﬂow payoﬀ, because the service provider
can only observe their aggregate consumption.




e−rt(¯ bt − at) dt. (1)
In the unique static Nash equilibrium of this game, the service provider makes zero investment
and the consumers choose zero service level. As we show in Section 5,s in the repeated game
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Figure 1: Equilibrium payoﬀs and actions in the game of quality standards.
given by (1)), the only equilibrium is the repetition of the static Nash equilibrium. Hence, unlike
in discrete-time repeated games, here it is impossible for the consumers to create intertemporal
incentives for the monopolist to invest, despite the fact that the monopolist’s investment can
be statistically identiﬁed (i.e., diﬀerent investment levels induce diﬀerent drifts for the quality
signal Xt).
However, if the large player were able to credibly commit to investment level a∗ ∈ [0,1], he
would be able to inﬂuence the consumers’ decisions and get a better payoﬀ. Each consumer’s
choice, bi, would maximize their expected ﬂow payoﬀ bi(a∗(4 − ¯ b) − 1), and in equilibrium all
consumers would choose the same level b∗i = max{0,4 − 1/a∗}. The service provider would
earn a proﬁt of max{0,4−1/a∗}−a∗ and at a∗ = 1 this function achieves its maximal value of
2, the monopolist’s Stackelberg payoﬀ.
Following these observations, it is interesting to explore the repeated game with reputation
eﬀects. Assume that at time zero the consumers believe that with probability p ∈ (0,1) the
service provider is a behavioral type, who always chooses investment a∗ = 1, and with probability
1 − p he is a normal type, who chooses at to maximize his expected discounted proﬁt. What
happens in equilibrium?
The top panel of Figure 1 displays the unique sequential equilibrium payoﬀ of the normal
5type as a function of the population’s belief p, for diﬀerent discount rates r. In equilibrium the
consumers continually update their belief φt, the probability assigned to the behavioral type,
using the observations of the public signal Xt. The equilibrium is Markovian in the posterior
belief φt, which uniquely determines the equilibrium actions of the normal type (bottom left
panel) and the consumers (bottom right panel).
Consistent with the asymptotic payoﬀ bound from Faingold (2006, Theorem 3.1), the com-
putation shows that as r → 0, the large player’s payoﬀ converges to his commitment payoﬀ of
2. We also see from Figure 1 that the customer usage level ¯ b increases towards the commitment
level of 3 as the discount rate r decreases towards 0. While the normal type chooses action 0 for
all levels of φt when r = 2, as r is closer to 0, his action increases towards a∗ = 1. However, the
imitation of the behavioral type by the normal type is never perfect, even for very low discount
rates.
In this example for every discount rate r > 0 the equilibrium action of the normal type is
exactly 0 near φ = 0 and 1 and the population’s action is 0 near φ = 0 (not visible in Figure 1 for
r = 0.1). The normal type of the large player imitates the behavioral type only for intermediate
levels of reputation.
Using our characterization from Section 6, we can not only compute equilibria in examples,
but also prove comparative statics results analytically. For example, consider a variation of our
game in which the payoﬀ ﬂow of the small players is given by αbi
t dXt − bi
t dt, where α > 0 is a
parameter. In Appendix C.4 we show that for every prior p ∈ (0,1), the equilibrium payoﬀ of
the large player weakly increases in α.
3 The Repeated Game.
A large player participates in a repeated game with a continuum of small players uniformly
distributed on I = [0,1]. At each time t ∈ [0,∞), the large player chooses an action at ∈ A
and each small player i ∈ I chooses an action bi
t ∈ B based on their current information.
Action spaces A and B are compact subsets of an Euclidean space. The small players’ moves
are anonymous: at each time t, the large player observes the aggregate distribution ¯ bt ∈ ∆(B)
of the small players’ actions, but does not observe the action of any individual small player.
There is imperfect monitoring: the large player’s moves are not observable to the small players.
Instead, the small players see a noisy public signal (Xt)t≥0 that depends on the actions of the
large player, the aggregate distribution of the small players’ actions and noise. Speciﬁcally,
dXt = µ(at,¯ bt) dt + σ(¯ bt)   dZt,
where (Zt) is a d-dimensional Brownian motion, and the drift and the volatility of the signal
are continuous functions µ : A × B → Rd and σ : B → Rd×d, which are linearly extended to
A × ∆(B) and ∆(B) respectively.2 For technical reasons, assume that there exists c > 0 such
that |σ(b)   y| ≥ c|y|, ∀y ∈ Rd, ∀b ∈ B. Denote by (Ft)t≥0 the ﬁltration generated by (Xt).
2Functions   and σ are extended to distributions over B via  (a,¯ b) =
R




6Our assumption that only the drift of X depends on the large player’s action corresponds to
the constant support assumption that is standard in discrete time repeated games. By Girsanov’s
Theorem the probability measures over the paths of two diﬀusion processes with the same
volatility but diﬀerent bounded drifts are equivalent, that is, they have the same zero-probabilty
events. Since the volatility of a continuous-time diﬀusion process is eﬀectively observable, we
do not allow σ(¯ b) to depend on a.3
Small players have identical preferences.4 The payoﬀ of each small player depends only on
his own action, the aggregate distribution of the small players’ actions, and the sample path of






t,¯ bt)dt + v(bi
t,¯ bt)   dXt
￿
where u : B × B → R and v : B × B → Rd are continuously diﬀerentiable functions that
are extended linearly to B × ∆(B). Then the expected payoﬀ ﬂow of the small players h :
A × B × ∆(B) → R is given by
h(a,b,¯ b) = u(b,¯ b) + v(b,¯ b)   µ(a,¯ b).
The small players’ payoﬀ functions are common knowledge.
The small players are uncertain about the type θ of the large player. At time 0 they believe
that with probability p ∈ [0,1] the large player is a behavioral type (θ = b) and with probability
1−p he is a normal type (θ = n). The behavioral type mechanically plays a ﬁxed action a∗ ∈ A
at all times. The normal type plays strategically to maximize his expected payoﬀ. The payoﬀ





where the payoﬀ ﬂow is deﬁned through a continuously diﬀerentiable function g : A × B → R
that is extended linearly to A × ∆(B).
In the dynamic game the small players update their beliefs about the type of the large player
by Bayes rule from their observations of X. Denote by φt the probability that the small players
assign to the large player being a behavioral type at time t ≥ 0.
A pure public strategy of the normal type of large player is a progressively measurable (with
respect to (Ft)) process (at)t≥0 with values in A. Similarly, a pure public strategy of small player
i ∈ I is a progressively measurable process (bi
t)t≥0 with values in B. We assume that jointly the
strategies of the small players and the aggregate distribution satisfy appropriate measurability
properties.
3If some dimensions of the large player’s actions were observable, as the price in the game of quality standards,
the normal type would have to imitate the behavioral type perfectly along those dimensions, or else reveal himself.
Our results can be generalized to such a setting with minor modiﬁcations (e.g. the large player may sometimes
mix between revealing himself or not).
4The characterization of our paper can be easily extended to a setting where the small players observe the
same public signal, but have heterogeneous preferences.
7Deﬁnition 1. A public sequential equilibrium consists of a public strategy (at)t≥0 of the nor-
mal type of large player, public strategies (bi
t)t≥0 of small players i ∈ I, and a progressively
measurable belief process (φt)t≥0, such that at all times t and after all public histories:








￿ θ = n
￿
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￿ θ = b
￿
(c) beliefs (φt)t≥0 are determined by Bayes rule given the common prior φ0 = p.
A strategy proﬁle that satisﬁes conditions (a) and (b) is called sequentially rational. A belief
process (φt) that satisﬁes condition (c) is called consistent.
In Section 4 we explore these properties in detail and characterize them in our setting (The-
orem 1). We use this characterization in Section 5 to explore the game with prior p = 0, and
in Section 6 to present a set of suﬃcient conditions under which the sequential equilibrium for
any prior is unique and Markovian in the population’s belief. In this case, we characterize the
sequential equilibrium payoﬀs of the normal type as well as the equilibrium strategies via an ordi-
nary diﬀerential equation. In Section 7 we characterize the large player’s sequential equilibrium
payoﬀs when multiple equilibria exist.
Remark 1. Although the aggregate distribution of the small players’ actions is publicly observ-
able, our requirement that public strategies depend only on the sample paths of X is without
loss of generality. In fact, for a given strategy proﬁle, the public histories along which there
are observations of ¯ bt that diﬀer from those on-the-path-of-play correspond to deviations by a
positive measure of small players. Therefore our deﬁnition of public strategies does not alter the
set of public sequential equilibrium outcomes.
Remark 2. All our results hold for public sequential equilibria in mixed strategies. A mixed
public strategy of the large player is a random process (¯ at)t≥0 progressively measurable with
respect to Ft with values in ∆(A). The drift function µ should be extended linearly to ∆(A) ×
∆(B) to allow for mixed strategies. Because there is a continuum of anonymous small players,
the assumption that each of them plays a pure strategy is without loss of generality.
Remark 3. For both pure and mixed equilibria, the restriction to public strategies is without
loss of generality in our games. For pure strategies, it is redundant to condition a player’s current
action on his private history, as it is completely determined by the public history. For mixed
strategies, the restriction to public strategies is without loss of generality in repeated games in
which the signals have a product structure, as in our games.5 Informally, to form a belief about
5In a game with a product structure each public signal depends on the actions of only one large player. See
the deﬁnition in Fudenberg and Levine (1994, Section 5)
8his opponent’s private histories, in a game with product structure a player can ignore his own
past actions because they do not inﬂuence the signal about his opponent’s actions. Formally, a
mixed private strategy of the large player in our game is a random process (at) with values in
A that is progressively measurable with respect to a ﬁltration (Gt), which is generated by the
public signals X and the large player’s private randomization. For any private strategy of the
large player, an equivalent mixed public strategies is deﬁned by letting ¯ at be the conditional
distribution of at given Ft. Strategies at and ¯ at induce the same probability distributions over
public signals and give the large player the same expected payoﬀ (given Ft).
4 The Structure of Sequential Equilibria.
This section provides a characterization of public sequential equilibria of our game, which is
summarized in Theorem 1. In equilibrium, the small players always choose a static best response
given their belief about the large player’s actions. The behavioral type of the large player always
chooses action a∗, while the normal type chooses his actions strategically taking into account
his expected future payoﬀ, which depends on the public signal X. The dynamic evolution of the
small players’ belief is also determined by X.
The equilibrium play has to satisfy two conditions: the beliefs must be consistent with
the players’ strategies, and the strategies must be sequentially rational given beliefs. For the
consistency of beliefs, Proposition 1 presents equation (1) that describes how the small players’
belief evolves with the public signal X. Sequential rationality of the normal type’s strategy is
veriﬁed by looking at the evolution of his continuation value Wt, the future expected payoﬀ of
the normal type given the history of public signals X up until time t. Proposition 2 presents a
necessary and suﬃcient condition for the law of motion of a random process W, under which W
is the continuation value of the normal type. Proposition 3 presents a condition for sequential
rationality that is connected to the law of motion of W. Propositions 2 and 3 are analogous to
Propositions 1 and 2 from Sannikov (2006b).
Subsequent sections of our paper use the equilibrium characterization of Theorem 1. Sec-
tion 5 uses Theorem 1 to show that in the complete-information repeated game in which the
small players are certain that they are facing the normal type, the set of public sequential equi-
librium payoﬀs of the large player coincides with the convex hull of his static Nash equilibrium
payoﬀs. Section 6 analyzes a convenient class of games in which the public sequential equi-
librium turns out to be unique and Markovian in the population’s posterior belief. Section 7
characterizes the set of public sequential equilibrium payoﬀs of the large player generally.
We begin with Proposition 1, which explains how the small players use Bayes rule to update
their beliefs based on the observations of the public signals.6
Proposition 1 (Belief Consistency). Fix a public strategy proﬁle (at,¯ bt)t≥0 and a prior p ∈ [0,1]
6A simpler version of equation (2) for history-independent drifts has been used in the literature on strategic
experimentation in continuous time. See, e.g., Bolton and Harris (1999, Lemma 1) and Moscarini and Smith
(2001, equation 2). For a more general ﬁltering equation, which allows the unknown parameter θ to follow a
Markov process, see Liptser and Shiryaev (1977, Theorem 9.1).
9on the behavioral type. Belief process (φt)t≥0 is consistent with (at,¯ bt)t≥0 if and only if it satisﬁes
dφt = γ(at,¯ bt,φt)   dZ
φ
t (2)
with initial condition φ0 = p, where
γ(a,¯ b,φ) = φ(1 − φ)σ(¯ b)−1 ￿





t = σ(¯ bt)−1(dXt − µφt(at,¯ bt) dt), and (4)
µφ(a,¯ b) = φµ(a∗,¯ b) + (1 − φ)µ(a,¯ b). (5)
Proof. The strategies of the two types of large player induce two diﬀerent probability measures
over the paths of the signal (Xt). From Girsanov’s Theorem we can ﬁnd the ratio ξt between
the likelihood that a path (Xs : s ∈ [0,t]) arises for type b and the likelihood that it arises for
type n. This ratio is characterized by
dξt = ξt ρt   dZn
s, ξ0 = 1, (6)
where ρt = σ(¯ bt)−1 ￿
µ(a∗,¯ bt) − µ(at,¯ bt)
￿
and (Zn
t ) is a Brownian motion under the probability
measure generated by type n’s strategy.
Suppose that belief process (φt) is consistent with (at,¯ bt)t≥0. Then, by Bayes’ rule, the
posterior after observing a path (Xs : s ∈ [0,t]) is
φt =
pξt





(pξt + (1 − p))2dξt −
2p2(1 − p)
(pξt + (1 − p))3
ξ2
tρt   ρt
2
dt
= φt(1 − φt)ρt   dZn
t − φ2
t(1 − φt)(ρt   ρt) dt (8)
= φt(1 − φt)ρt   dZ
φ
t ,
which is equation (2).
Conversely, suppose that (φt) is a process that solves equation (2) with initial condition







By another application of Ito’s formula, we conclude that (ξt) satisﬁes equation (6). This implies
that ξt is the ratio between the likelihood that a path (Xs : s ∈ [0,t]) arises for type b and the
likelihood that it arises for type n. Hence, φt is determined by Bayes rule and the belief process
is consistent with (at,¯ bt).
In the equations of Proposition 1, (at) is the strategy that the normal type is supposed to
follow. If the normal type deviates, his deviation aﬀects only the drift of X, but not the other
terms in equation (2).
10Coeﬃcient γ in equation (2) is the volatility of beliefs: it reﬂects the speed with which the
small players learn about the type of the large player. The deﬁnition of γ plays an important role
in the characterization of public sequential equilibria presented in Sections 6 and 7 (Theorems 3
and 4). The intuition behind equation (2) is as follows. If the small players are convinced about
the type of the large player, then φt(1 − φt) = 0, so they never change their beliefs. When
φt ∈ (0,1) then γ(at,¯ bt,φt) is larger, and learning is faster, when the noise σ(¯ bt) is smaller or
the drifts produced by the two types diﬀer more. From the small players’ perspective, (Z
φ
t )
is a Brownian motion and their belief (φt) is a martingale. From equation (8) we see that,
conditional on the large player being the normal type, the drift of φt is non-positive: in the long
run, either the small players learn that they are facing the normal type, or the normal type
plays like the behavioral type.
We turn to the analysis of the second important state descriptor of the interaction between
the large and the small players, the continuation value of the normal type. A player’s con-
tinuation value is his future expected payoﬀ after a given public history for a given proﬁle of
continuation strategies. We derive how the large player’s incentives arise from the law of motion
of his continuation value. We will ﬁnd that the large player’s strategy is optimal if and only if
a certain local incentive constraint holds at all times t ≥ 0.
For a given strategy proﬁle S = (at,¯ bt)t≥0, the continuation value Wt(S) of the normal type









￿ θ = n
￿
(9)
Proposition 2 below characterizes the law of motion of Wt.






< ∞ for all 0 < T < ∞.
Proposition 2 (Continuation Values). A bounded process (Wt)t≥0 is the continuation value
of the normal type under the public-strategy proﬁle S = (at,¯ bt)t≥0 if and only if for some d-
dimensional process (βt) in L∗, we have
dWt = r(Wt − g(at,¯ bt))dt + rβt   (dXt − µ(at,¯ bt) dt). (10)
Proof. First, note that Wt(S) is a bounded process by (9), and let us show that Wt = Wt(S)
satisﬁes (10) for some d-dimensional process βt in L∗. Denote by Vt(S) the average discounted













e−rsg(as,¯ bs)ds + Wt(S) (11)
Then Vt is a martingale when the large player is of normal type. By the Martingale Represen-
tation Theorem, there exists a d-dimensional process βt in L∗ such that
dVt(S) = re−rtβt   σ(¯ bt)dZn
t , (12)
where dZn
t = σ(¯ bt)−1(dXt − µ(at,¯ bt) dt) is a Brownian motion from the point of view of the
normal type of the large player.
11Diﬀerentiating (11) with respect to time yields
dVt(S) = re−rtg(at,¯ bt)dt − re−rtWt(S)dt + e−rtdWt(S) (13)
Combining equations (12) and (13) yields (10).
Conversely, let us show if Wt is a bounded process that satisﬁes (10) then Wt = Wt(S).




e−rsg(as,¯ bs) ds + e−rtWt
is a martingale under the strategies S = (at,¯ bt) because dVt = re−rtβt   σ(¯ bt)dZn
t by (10).
Moreover, martingales Vt and Vt(S) converge because both e−rtWt and e−rtWt(S) converge to
0. Therefore,
Vt = Et[V∞] = Et[V∞(S)] = Vt(S) ⇒ Wt = Wt(S)
for all t, as required.
Representation (10) describes how Wt(S), deﬁned above, evolves with the public history. It
is valid independently of the large player’s actions until time t, which caused a given history
(Xs,s ∈ [0,t]) to realize. This fact is important in the proof of Proposition 3 below, which deals
with incentives.
Next, we derive conditions for sequential rationality. The condition for the small players is
straightforward: they maximize their static payoﬀ because a deviation of an individual small
player does not aﬀect future equilibrium play. The situation of the normal type of large player
is more complicated: he acts optimally if he maximizes the sum of his current payoﬀ ﬂow and
the expected change in his continuation value.
Proposition 3 (Sequential Rationality). A public strategy proﬁle (at,¯ bt)t≥0 is sequentially ra-




g(a′,¯ bt) + βt   µ(a′,¯ bt), (14)
b ∈ argmax
b′∈B
u(b′,¯ bt) + v(b′,¯ bt)   µφt(at,¯ bt), ∀b ∈ support¯ bt . (15)
Proof. Consider a strategy proﬁle (at,¯ bt) and an alternative strategy (˜ at) of the normal type.
Denote by Wt the continuation payoﬀ of the normal type when he follows strategy (at) after time
t, while the population follows (¯ bt). If the normal type of large player plays strategy (˜ at) up to
time t and then switches back to (at), his expected payoﬀ conditional on the public information
at time t is given by
˜ Vt = r
Z t
0
e−rsg(˜ as,¯ bs)ds + e−rtWt .
By Proposition 2 and the expression above,
d˜ Vt = re−rt ￿




(g(˜ at,¯ bt) − g(at,¯ bt))dt + βt   (dXt − µ(at,¯ bt)dt)
￿
,
12where the process β ∈ L∗ is given by representation (10).
Hence the proﬁle (˜ at,¯ bt) yields the normal type expected payoﬀ


















where the expectations are taken under the probability measure induced by (˜ at,¯ bt), and so (Xt)
has drift µ(˜ at,¯ bt).
Suppose that strategy proﬁle (at,¯ bt) and belief process (φt) satisfy the incentive constraints
(14) and (15). Then, for every (˜ at), one has W0 ≥ ˜ W0, and so the normal type is sequentially
rational at time 0. By a similar argument, the normal type is sequentially rational at all times
t, after all public histories. Note also that the small players are maximizing their instantaneous
expected payoﬀs. Since the small players are anonymous, no unilateral deviation by a small
player can aﬀect the future course of play. Therefore each small player is also sequentially
rational.
Conversely, suppose that incentive constraint (14) fails. Choose a strategy (˜ at) such that
˜ at attains the maximum in (14) for all t ≥ 0. Then ˜ W0 > W0 and the large player is not
sequentially rational at t = 0. Likewise, if condition (15) fails, then a positive measure of small
players is not maximizing their instantaneous expected payoﬀs. Since the small player’s actions
are anonymous, their strategies would not be sequentially rational.
We can now summarize our characterization of sequential equilibria.
Theorem 1 (Sequential Equilibrium). A proﬁle (at,¯ bt,φt) is a public sequential equilibrium
with continuation values (Wt) for the normal type if and only if
(a) (Wt) is a bounded process that satisﬁes
dWt = r(Wt − g(at,¯ bt))dt + rβt   (dXt − µ(at,¯ bt) dt) (16)
for some process β ∈ L∗,
(b) belief process (φt) follows
dφt = γ(at,¯ bt,φt) σ(¯ bt)−1(dXt − µφt(at,¯ bt) dt), and (17)
(c) strategies (at,¯ bt) satisfy the incentive constraints
at ∈ argmaxa′∈A g(a′,¯ bt) + βtµ(a′,¯ bt), and
b ∈ argmaxb′∈B u(b′,¯ bt) + v(b′,¯ bt)   µφt(at,¯ bt), ∀b ∈ support¯ bt .
(18)
Theorem 1 provides a characterization of public sequential equilibria which can be used to
derive many of its properties. In Section 5 we apply Theorem 1 to the repeated game with prior
p = 0, the complete information game. In Sections 6 and 7 we characterize the correspondence
E : [0,1] ⇉ R that maps the prior probability p ∈ [0,1] on the behavioral type into the set
13of public sequential equilibrium payoﬀs of the normal type in the repeated game with prior p.
Theorem 1 implies that E is the largest bounded correspondence such that a controlled process
(φt,Wt), deﬁned by (16) and (17), can be kept in Graph(E) by controls (at,¯ bt) and (βt) that
satisfy (18).7
4.1 Gradual Revelation of the Large Player’s Type.
To end this section, we apply Theorem 1 to show that Condition 1 below is necessary and
suﬃcient for the reputation of the normal type to decay to 0 with probability 1 in any public
sequential equilibrium (Proposition 4). Condition 1 states that in any Nash equilibrium of the
static game with just the normal type, the large player cannot appear committed to action a∗.8
Naturally, this condition plays an important role in Sections 6 and 7, where we characterize
sequential equilibria with reputation.
Condition 1. For every Nash equilibrium (aN,¯ bN) of the static game with prior p = 0,
µ(aN,¯ bN)  = µ(a∗,¯ bN).
In discrete time, Cripps, Mailath, and Samuelson (2004) show that the reputation of the
normal type converges to zero in any sequential equilibrium under stronger conditions than
Condition 1. Among other assumptions, they also require that the small players’ best reply to
the commitment action be strict. In discrete time, an analogue of Condition 1 alone would not
be suﬃcient. (See Cripps, Mailath, and Samuelson (2004, p. 414).)
Proposition 4. If Condition 1 fails, then for any p ∈ [0,1] the stage game has a Bayesian Nash
equilibrium (BNE) in which the normal and the behavioral types look the same to the population.
The repetition of this BNE is a public sequential equilibrium of the repeated game with prior p,
in which the population’s belief stays constant.
If Condition 1 holds, then in any public sequential equilibrium φt → 0 as t → ∞ almost
surely under the normal type.
Proof. If Condition 1 fails, then there is a static Nash equilibrium (aN,¯ bN) of the complete-
information game with µ(aN,¯ bN) = µ(a∗,¯ bN). It is easy to see that (aN,¯ bN) is also a BNE of
the stage game with any prior p. The repetition of this BNE is a public sequential equilibrim
of the repeated game, in which the beliefs φt ∈ p remain constant. With these beliefs (17) and
(18) hold, and Wt = g(aN,¯ bN) for all t.
Conversely, if Condition 1 holds there is no BNE (a,¯ b) of the static game with prior p > 0
in which µ(a,¯ b) = µ(a∗,¯ b). Otherwise, (a,¯ b) would be a Nash equilibrium of the static game
with prior p = 0, since the small players’ payoﬀs depend on the actions of the large player only
through the drift, a contradiction to Condition 1.
We present the rest of the proof in Appendix A, where we show that for some constants
C > 0 and M > 0, in every sequential equilibrium at all times t either
7This means that there does not exist a bounded correspondence with such property whose graph contains the
graph of E as a proper subset.
8Note that the action of the large player aﬀects the small players’ payoﬀs only through the drift of X.
14(a) the absolute value of the volatility of φt is at least Cφt(1 − φt) or
(b) the absolute value of the volatility of Wt is at least M.
To see this intuitively, note that if the volatility of φt at time t is 0, i.e. γ(at,¯ bt,φt) = 0, then
(at,¯ bt) is not a BNE of the stage game by Condition 1. Then the incentive constraints (18)
imply that βt  = 0. In Appendix A we rely on the fact that Wt is a bounded process to show that
under conditions (a) and (b), φt eventually decays to 0 when the large player is normal.
Proposition 4 also implies that players never reach an absorbing state in any public sequential
equilibrium if and only if Condition 1 holds. Players reach an absorbing state at time t if
their actions as well as the population’s beliefs remain ﬁxed after that time. We know that
in continuous-time games between two large players, equilibrium play sometimes necessarily
reaches an absorbing state, as shown in Sannikov (2006b). This possibility requires special
treatment in the characterization of equilibria in games between two large players.
5 Equilibrium Degeneracy under Complete Information.
In this section we examine the structure of the set of equilibrium payoﬀs of the large player in
the complete information game (p = 0), that is, in the game in which it is common knowledge
that the large player is the normal type.
Theorem 2. Suppose the small players are certain that they are facing the normal type, that is,
p = 0. Then in every public sequential equilibrium of the repeated game the large player cannot




a ∈ argmaxa′∈A g(a′,¯ b)
b ∈ argmaxb′∈B u(b′,¯ b) + v(b′,¯ b)   µ(a,¯ b), ∀b ∈ support¯ b
)
.
Proof. Let ¯ v be the highest Nash equilibrium payoﬀ of the large player in the static game. We
will show that it is impossible to achieve a payoﬀ higher than ¯ v in any public equilibrium. (A
proof for the lowest Nash equilibrium payoﬀ is similar). Suppose there was a public equilibrium
in which the large player’s continuation value W0 was greater than ¯ v. By Proposition 3, for
some random process (βt) in L∗, the large player’s continuation value satisﬁes
dWt = r(Wt − g(at,¯ bt)) dt + rβt   (dXt − µ(at,¯ bt) dt),
where at maximizes g(a′,¯ bt) + βtµ(a′,¯ bt) over all a′ ∈ A. Denote ¯ D = W0 − ¯ v.
We claim that there exists δ > 0 such that, so long as Wt ≥ ¯ v + ¯ D/2, either the drift of Wt
is greater than r ¯ D/4 or the norm of the volatility of Wt is greater than δ. To prove this claim
we need the following lemma, whose proof is in Appendix A:
Lemma 1. For any ε > 0 there exists δ > 0 (independent of t or the sample path) such that
|βt| ≥ δ whenever g(at,¯ bt) ≥ ¯ v + ε.
15Letting ε = ¯ D/4 in the lemma above we obtain δ > 0 such that |βt| ≥ δ whenever g(at,¯ bt) ≥
¯ v + ¯ D/4. Moreover, if g(at,¯ bt) < ¯ v + ¯ D/4 then, so long as Wt ≥ ¯ v + ¯ D/2, the drift of Wt is
greater than r ¯ D/4, concluding the proof of the claim.
It follows directly from the claim that with positive probability Wt becomes arbitrarily large,
which is a contradiction since Wt is bounded.
The intuition behind this result is as follows. In order to give incentives to the large player
to take an action that results in a payoﬀ better than in static Nash equilibrium, his continuation
value must respond to the public signal Xt. When his continuation value reaches its upper
bound, such incentives cannot be provided. In eﬀect, if at the upper bound the large player’s
continuation value were sensitive to the public signal process (Xt), then with positive probability
the continuation value would escape above this upper bound, which is not possible. Therefore,
at the upper bound, continuation values cannot depend on the public signal and so, in the best
equilibrium, the normal type must be playing a myopic best response.
While Theorem 2 does not hold in discrete time,9 it is deﬁnitely not just a result of
continuous-time technicalities. The large player’s incentives to depart from a static best response
become fragile when he is ﬂexible to respond to public information quickly. The foundations of
this result are similar to the deterioration of incentives due to the ﬂexibility to respond to new
information quickly in Abreu, Milgrom, and Pearce (1991) in a prisoners’ dilemma with Poisson
signals and, especially, in Sannikov and Skrzypacz (2006a) in a Cournot duopoly with Brownian
signals.
Borrowing intuition from the latter paper, suppose that the large player must hold his
action ﬁxed for an interval of time of length ∆ > 0. Suppose that the large player’s equilibrium
incentives to take the Stackelberg action are created through a statistical test that triggers an
equilibrium punishment if the signal is suﬃciently bad. A proﬁtable deviation has a gain on
the order of ∆, the length of a time period. Therefore, such a deviation is prevented only if it
increases the probability of triggering punishment by at least O(∆). Sannikov and Skrzypacz
(2006a) show that with Brownian signals, the log likelihood ratio for a test against any particular
deviation is normally distributed. A deviation shifts the mean of this distribution by O(
√
∆).
Then, a successful test against a deviation would generate a false positive with probability of
O(
√
∆). This probability, which reﬂects the value destroyed in each period through punishments,
is disproportionately large for small ∆ compared to the value created during a period of length
∆. This intuition implies that in equilibrium the large player cannot sustain payoﬀs above
static Nash as ∆ → 0. Figure 2 illustrates the densities of the log likelihood ratio under the
’recommended’ action of the large player and a deviation, and the areas responsible for the large
player’s incentives and for false positives.
Apart from this statistical intuition, the analysis of the game in Sannikov and Skrzypacz
(2006a), as well as in Abreu, Milgrom, and Pearce (1991), diﬀer from ours. Those papers look
at the game between two large players, either focusing on symmetric equilibria or assuming
9Fudenberg and Levine (1994) show that equilibria with payoﬀs above static Nash often exist in discrete time,












Figure 2: A statistical test to prevent a given deviation.
a failure of pairwise identiﬁability to derive their results.10 In contrast, our result is proved
directly in continuous time and for games from a diﬀerent class, with small players but without
any failure of identiﬁability.
Motivated by our result, a recent paper by Fudenberg and Levine (2006) studies the diﬀer-
ences between Poisson and Brownian signals by taking the period between actions to zero in
a moral hazard game between a large and a population of small players. They allow the large
player’s action to aﬀect the variance of the Brownian signal and show that nontrivial equilibria
exist whenever the variance is decreasing in the large player’s eﬀort level.11
6 Reputation Games with a Unique Sequential Equilibrium.
In many games, including the game of quality standards from Section 2, for every prior p ∈ (0,1)
the public sequential equilibrium is unique and Markovian in the population’s belief. That is,
the current belief φt uniquely determines the players’ actions at = a(φt) and ¯ bt = b(φt), as well
as the continuation value of the normal type Wt = U(φt). This section presents a suﬃcient
condition for the equilibrium to be unique and Markovian, and characterizes Markov perfect
equilibria using an ordinary diﬀerential equation.
First, we derive our characterization informally. Proposition 1 implies that in equilibrium
the population’s belief evolves according to





dt + γ(at,¯ bt,φt) dZn
t , (19)
where dZn
t = σ(¯ bt)−1(dXt − µ(at,¯ bt)dt) is a Brownian motion under the strategy of the normal
type. If the equilibrium is Markovian, then by Ito’s lemma the continuation value Wt = U(φt)
10The assumption of pairwise identiﬁability, introduced to repeated games by Fudenberg, Levine, and Maskin
(1994), states that deviations by diﬀerent players can be statistically distinguished given the observations of the
public signals.
11They also ﬁnd the surprising result that if the variance of the Brownian signal is increasing in the large
player’s eﬀort level, then equilibrium must collapse to static Nash. The equilibrium collapse occurs despite the







Figure 3: The large player’s payoﬀ in a Markov perfect equilibrium.
of the normal type follows








dt + U′(φt)γ(at,¯ bt,φt) dZn
t . (20)
At the same time, Proposition 2 gives an alternative equation for the motion of Wt = U(φt),
dWt = r(Wt − g(at,¯ bt))dt + rβtσ(¯ bt) dZn
t . (21)
By matching the drifts and volatilities of (20) and (21), we can characterize Markov perfect





2r(U(φ) − g(a(φ),¯ b(φ)))
|γ(a(φ),¯ b(φ),φ)|2 , (22)
for the value function U. We can get the equilibrium actions a(φ) and b(φ) by matching the
volatilities. Since
rβtσ(¯ bt) = U′(φt)γ(at,¯ bt,φt) ⇒ rβt = U′(φt)γ(at,¯ bt,φt)σ−1(¯ bt),
Proposition 3 implies that





a ∈ argmaxa′∈A rg(a′,¯ b) + z(µ(a∗,¯ b) − µ(a,¯ b))σ(¯ b)−2µ(a′,¯ b)
b ∈ argmaxb′∈B u(b′,¯ b) + v(b′,¯ b)   µφ(a,¯ b), ∀b ∈ support ¯ b
)
,
for each (φ,z) ∈ [0,1] × R. We show that the public sequential equilibrium is unique and
Markovian under Condition 2 below, which requires that the correspondence Ψ be single-valued.
Then the equilibrium actions are uniquely determined by (a(φ),¯ b(φ)) = Ψ(φ,φ(1 − φ)U′(φ)),
18where U satisﬁes equation (22). Figure 3 illustrates the function U : [0,1] → R for the game of
quality standards of Section 2.
These simple properties of equilibria follow from the continuous-time formulation. As the
reader may guess, the logic behind this result is similar to that in Section 5. It is impossible to
create incentives to sustain greater payoﬀs than in a Markov perfect equilibrium. Informally, in
a public sequential equilibrium that achieves the largest diﬀerence W0 −U(φ0) across all priors,
the joint volatility of (φ0,W0) has to be parallel to the slope of U(φ0), since Wt − U(φt) cannot
increase for any realization of X at time 0. It follows that rβ0σ(¯ b0) = U′(φ0)γ(a0,¯ b0,φ0). Thus,
when Ψ is single-valued the players’ actions at time zero must be Markovian, which leads to
Wt − U(φt) having a positive drift at time zero, a contradiction.
In discrete-time reputation games equilibrium behavior is typically not determined uniquely
by the population’s posterior, and Markov perfect equilibria may not even exist. Our result, pre-
sented in Theorem 3 below, shows that continuous time provides an attractive way of modeling
reputation.12 Theorem 3 assumes Condition 1 from Section 4 and:
Condition 2. Ψ is a nonempty, single-valued, Lipschitz-continuous correspondence that returns
an atomic distribution of small players’ actions for all φ ∈ [0,1] and z ∈ R.
Eﬀectively, the correspondence Ψ returns the Bayesian Nash equilibria of an auxiliary static
game in which the large player is a behavioral type with probability φ and the payoﬀs of the
normal type are perturbed by a reputational weight of z. In particular, with φ = z = 0 Condi-
tion 2 implies that the stage game with a normal large player has a unique Nash equilibrium.
Moreover, by Theorem 2, the complete information repeated game also has a unique equilibrium,
the repeated play of the static Nash.
While Condition 2 is fairly essential for the uniqueness result, Condition 1 is not. If Condition
2 holds but Condition 1 fails, then the repeated game with prior p would have a unique public
sequential equilibrium (at = aN,¯ bt = ¯ bN,φt = p), which is trivially Markovian. Here (aN,¯ bN)
denotes the unique Nash equilibrium of the stage game, in which µ(aN,¯ bN) = µ(a∗,¯ bN) when
Condition 1 fails.13
Theorem 3. Under Conditions 1 and 2, E is a single-valued correspondence that coincides with





2r(U(φ) − g(Ψ(φ,φ(1 − φ)U′(φ))))
|γ(Ψ(φ,φ(1 − φ)U′(φ)),φ)|2 . (23)
At p = 0 and 1, E(φ) satisﬁes the boundary conditions
lim
φ→p
U(φ) = E(p) = g(Ψ(p,0)), and lim
φ→p
φ(1 − φ)U′(φ) = 0. (24)
12We expect our methods to apply broadly to other continuous-time games, such as the Cournot competition
with mean-reverting prices of Sannikov and Skrzypacz (2006a). In that model the market price is the payoﬀ-
relevant state variable.
13When Condition 1 fails but Condition 2 holds, by an argument similar to the proof of Theorem 2 we can
show that the large player cannot achieve any payoﬀ other than g(a
N,¯ b
N). Note that Theorem 1 implies that
either (at,¯ bt) = (a
N,¯ b
N) or |βt|  = 0 at all times t.
19For any prior p ∈ (0,1) the unique public sequential equilibrium is a Markov perfect equilibrium
in the population’s belief. In this equilibrium, the players’ actions at time t are given by
(at,¯ bt) = Ψ(φt,φt(1 − φt)U′(φt)), (25)
the population’s belief evolves according to
dφt = γ(at,¯ bt,φt) σ(¯ bt)−1(dXt − µφt(at,¯ bt) dt), (26)
and the continuation values of the normal type are given by Wt = U(φt).
Proof. Proposition 8 from Appendix C.2 shows that under Conditions 1 and 2, there exists a
unique continuous function U : [0,1] → R that stays in the interval of feasible payoﬀs of the
large player, satisﬁes equation (22) on (0,1) and boundary conditions (38), which include (24).
We need to prove that for any prior p ∈ (0,1) there are no public sequential equilibria with a
payoﬀ to the normal type diﬀerent from U(p), and that the unique equilibrium with value U(p)
satisﬁes the conditions of the theorem.
Let us show that for any prior p ∈ (0,1), there are no equilibria with a payoﬀ to the large
player other than U(p). Suppose, towards a contradiction, that for some p ∈ [0,1], (at,¯ bt,φt)
is a public sequential equilibrium that yields the normal type a payoﬀ of W0  = U(p). Without
loss of generality, consider the case when W0 > U(p).
Then by Theorem 1, the population’s equilibrium belief follows (19), the continuation value
of the normal type follows (21) for some process (βt), and equilibrium actions and beliefs satisfy












rβtσ(¯ bt) − γ(at,¯ bt,φt)U′(φt). (28)
Lemma 13 from Appendix C.3 shows that for every ε > 0 there exists δ > 0 such that for all
t ≥ 0, either
(a) the drift of Dt is greater than rDt − ε or
(b) the absolute value of the volatility of Dt is greater than δ
Here we provide a crude intuition behind Lemma 13. When the volatility of Dt is exactly 0,
then rβtσ(¯ bt) = γ(at,¯ bt,φt)U′(φt), so




b ∈ argmaxb′∈B u(b′,¯ bt) + v(b′,¯ bt)   µφt(at,¯ bt) ∀ b ∈ support¯ bt
and (at,¯ bt) = Ψ(φt,φt(1 − φt)U′(φt)). Then by (22), the drift of Dt is exactly rDt.
20In order for the drift of Dt to be lower than rDt, the volatility of Dt has to be diﬀerent from
zero. Lemma 13 from Appendix C.3 presents a continuity argument to show that in order for
the drift to be below rDt − ε, the volatility of Dt has to be uniformly bounded away from 0.
By (a) and (b) above it follows that Dt would grow arbitrarily large with positive probability,
a contradiction since Wt and U(φt) are bounded processes. The contradiction shows that for
any prior p ∈ [0,1], there cannot be an equilibrium that yields the normal type a payoﬀ larger
than U(p). In a similar way, it can be shown that no equilibrium yields a payoﬀ below U(p).
Next, let us construct an equilibrium for a given prior p with value U(p) to the normal type
of the large player. Let (φt) be a solution to the stochastic diﬀerential equation (26) with the
actions deﬁned by (25). We will show that (at,¯ bt,φt) is a public sequential equilibrium in which
the bounded process Wt = U(φt) is the large player’s continuation value.
By Proposition 1 the beliefs (φt) are consistent with the strategy proﬁle (at,¯ bt). Moreover,
since Wt = U(φt) is a bounded process with drift r(Wt − g(at,¯ bt))dt by (20) and (22), Propo-
sition 2 implies that (Wt) is the process of continuation values of the normal type under the
strategy proﬁle (at,¯ bt). The process (βt) associated with the representation of Wt in Proposi-
tion 2 is given by rβtσ(bt) = U′(φt)γ(at,bt,φt). To see that the public-strategy proﬁle (at,¯ bt)
is sequentially rational with respect to beliefs (φt), recall that (at,¯ bt) = Ψ(φt,φt(1 − φt)U′(φt))
and so14




¯ bt = argmaxb′∈B u(b′,¯ bt) + v(b′,¯ bt)   µφt(at,¯ bt).
(29)
From Proposition 3 it follows that the strategy proﬁle (at,¯ bt) is sequentially rational. We
conclude that (at,¯ bt,φt) is a public sequential equilibrium.
Finally, let us show that the actions of the players are uniquely determined by the popula-
tion’s belief in any public sequential equilibrium (at,¯ bt,φt) by (25). Let Wt be the continuation
value of the normal type. We know that the pair (φt,Wt) must stay on the graph of U, be-
cause there are no public sequential equilibria with values other than U(φt) for any prior φt.
Therefore, the volatility of Dt = Wt − U(φt) must be 0, i.e. rβtσ(¯ bt) = U′(φt)γ(at,¯ bt,φt). Then
Proposition 3 implies that (29) holds and so (at,¯ bt) = Ψ(φt,φt(1 − φt)U′(φt)), as claimed.
The game of quality standards of Section 2 satisﬁes Conditions 1 and 2, and so its equilibrium
is unique and Markovian for every prior. For that game, the correspondence Ψ is given by
a =
(
0 if z ≤ r,
1 − r/z otherwise,
and b =
(
0 if φa∗ + (1 − φ)a ≤ 1/4,
4 − 1/(φa∗ + (1 − φ)a) otherwise.
The example illustrates a number of properties that follow from Theorem 3:
(a) The players’ actions, which are determined from the population’s belief φ by (a,¯ b) =
Ψ(φ,φ(1 − φ)U′(φ)), vary continuously with φ. In particular, when the belief gets close
to 0, the actions converge to the static Nash equilibrium. Thus, there is no discontinuity
14Recall that Ψ is a single-valued correspondence that returns an atomic distribution of the small players’
actions.
21for very small reputations, which is typical for inﬁnitely repeated reputation games with
perfect monitoring.
(b) The incentives of the normal type to imitate the behavioral type are increasing in φ(1 −
φ)U′(φ). However, imitation is never perfect, which is true for all games that satisfy
conditions 1 and 2. Indeed, since the actions are deﬁned by (25), (at = a∗,¯ bt) would be
a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the stage game with prior φt if the normal type imitated
the behavioral type perfectly at time t. However, Condition 1 implies that the stage game
does not have Bayesian Nash equilibria in which the normal type takes action a∗.
The actions of the players are often non-monotonic in beliefs. The large player’s actions
converge to static best responses at φ = 0 and 1, creating ∩-shaped dependence on reputation in
the quality standards game. Although not visible in Figure 1, the small players’ actions are also
non-monotonic for some discount rates.15 Nevertheless, the large player’s equilibrium payoﬀ U
is monotonic in the population’s belief in this example. This fact, which does not directly follow
from Theorem 3, holds generally under additional mild conditions.
6.1 The Eﬀect of Reputation on the Large Player’s Payoﬀ.
Proposition 5. Assume Conditions 1 and 2 and suppose that the static Bayesian Nash equi-
librium payoﬀ of the normal type is weakly increasing in the population’s prior belief p. Then,
the sequential equilibrium payoﬀ U(p) of the normal type is also weakly increasing in p.
Proof. The static Bayesian Nash equilibrium payoﬀ of the normal type is given by g(Ψ(φ,0)),
where φ is the prior on the behavioral type. Recall that U(0) = g(Ψ(0,0)) and U(1) = g(Ψ(1,0)).
Suppose U is not weakly increasing on [0,1]. Take a maximal subinterval [φ0,φ1] on which
U is strictly decreasing. Since U(0) ≤ U(1), it follows that [φ0,φ1]  = [0,1]. Without loss of
generality, assume that φ1 < 1.





U(φ0) > U(φ1) ≥ g(Ψ(φ1,0)) ≥ g(Ψ(0,0)) = U(0),




and so φ0 is a strict local minimum, a contradiction.
15For small discount rates r, not far from φ = 0 the slope of U gets very high as it grows towards the commitment
payoﬀ. This can cause the normal type to get very close to imitating the behavioral type, producing a peak in
the small players’ actions.
22The result of Proposition 5 is not obvious. Even in games in which the functions Ψ(φ,z) and
g(Ψ(φ,z)) are highly irregular and non-monotonic, the large player’s equilibrium payoﬀ U(φ) is
increasing in reputation φ as long as the static Bayesian Nash equilibrium payoﬀ of the large
player is increasing in reputation.
Remark 4. If the static Bayesian Nash equilibrium payoﬀ of the normal large player is increasing
in the small players’ belief p, then the conclusion of Theorem 3 holds even if the correspondence
Ψ is single-valued and Lipschitz-continuous only for z ≥ 0.16 Indeed, if we construct a new
correspondence ˆ Ψ from Ψ by replacing the values for z < 0 by an arbitrary Lipschitz-continuous
function, then the optimality equation with ˆ Ψ replacing Ψ would have a unique solution U with
boundary conditions U(0) = g(Ψ(0,0)) and U(1) = g(Ψ(1,0)) by Theorem 3. By Proposition 5
this solution must be monotonically non-increasing, and therefore it satisﬁes the original equation
with correspondence Ψ. All other arguments of Theorem 3 apply to the function U constructed
in this alternative way.
7 General Characterization.
In this section we extend the characterization of Section 6 to environments with multiple equilib-
ria. When correspondence Ψ is not single-valued (so Condition 2 is violated), the correspondence
of sequential equilibrium payoﬀs, E, may also not be single-valued either. Theorem 4 below char-
acterizes E for the general case.
Throughout this section, we maintain Condition 1 but relax Condition 2 to:
Condition 3. Ψ(φ,z) is non-empty for all (φ,z) ∈ [0,1] × R.
This is a weak assumption on the primitives of the game and it is automatically satisﬁed
when the action spaces are ﬁnite and Ψ is replaced by its mixed-action extension (see Remark 2).
Consider the optimality equation from Section 6 (see Theorem 3). When Ψ is a multi-valued





2r(U(φ) − g(a(φ),¯ b(φ)))
|γ(a(φ),¯ b(φ),φ)|2 , (30)
corresponding to diﬀerent measurable selections φ  → (a(φ),¯ b(φ)) ∈ Ψ(φ,φ(1 − φ)U′(φ)). An
argument similar to the proof of Theorem 3 can be used to show that for every such solution
U and every prior p, there exists a sequential equilibrium that achieves payoﬀ U(p) for the
normal type. Therefore, a natural conjecture is that the correspondence of sequential equilibrium
payoﬀs, E, contains all values between its upper boundary, the largest solution of (30), and its
lower boundary, the smallest solution of (30). Accordingly, the pair (a(φ),¯ b(φ)) ∈ Ψ(φ,φ(1 −
φ)U′(φ)) should minimize the right-hand side of (30) for the upper boundary, and maximize it
for the lower boundary.
16Such conclusion has practical value because under typical concavity assumptions on payoﬀs, the large player’s
objective function in the deﬁnition of Ψ may become convex instead of concave for z < 0.
23However, the diﬀerential equation







2r(u − g(a,¯ b))
|γ(a,¯ b,φ)|2 : (a,¯ b) ∈ Ψ(φ,φ(1 − φ)u′)
￿
, (32)
may fail to have a solution in the classical sense. In general, Ψ is upper hemi-continuous, but
not necessarily continuous, and so the right-hand side of (31) is lower semi-continuous but may
fail to be continuous.
Due to this diﬃculty, we rely on a generalized notion of solution called viscosity solution (see
Deﬁnition 2 below), which is suitable to deal with discontinuous equations. (For an introduction
to viscosity solutions we refer the reader to Crandall, Ishii, and Lions (1992).) We show that
the upper boundary U(φ) ≡ sup E(φ) is the largest viscosity solution of the upper optimality
equation (31), and that the lower boundary L(φ) ≡ inf E(φ) is the smallest solution of the lower
optimality equation, deﬁned by replacing the minimum by the maximum in the expression of H.
While in general viscosity solutions may fail to be diﬀerentiable, we show that the up-
per boundary U is a continuously diﬀerentiable function with absolutely continuous derivative.
When Ψ is single-valued in a neighborhood of (φ,φ(1 − φ)U′(φ)) for some φ ∈ (0,1), and H is
Lipschitz-continuous in a neighborhood of (φ,U(φ),U′(φ)), any viscosity solution is a classical
solution of (31) in a neighborhood of φ. Otherwise, we show that U′′(φ), which exists almost
everywhere since U′ is absolutely continuous, can take any value between H(φ,U(φ),U′(φ)) and
its upper semi-continuous envelope H∗(φ,U(φ),U′(φ)) (Note that H is lower semi-continuous,
that is, H = H∗.)
Deﬁnition 2. A bounded function U : (0,1) → R is a viscosity super-solution of the upper
optimality equation if for every φ0 ∈ (0,1) and every twice continuously diﬀerentiable test
function V : (0,1) → R,
U∗(φ0) = V (φ0) and U∗ ≥ V =⇒ V ′′(φ0) ≤ H∗(φ,V (φ0),V ′(φ0)).
A bounded function U : (0,1) → R is a viscosity sub-solution if for every φ0 ∈ (0,1) and every
twice continuously diﬀerentiable test function V : (0,1) → R,
U∗(φ0) = V (φ0) and U∗ ≤ V =⇒ V ′′(φ0) ≥ H∗(φ,V (φ0),V ′(φ0)).
A bounded function U is a viscosity solution if it is both a super-solution and a sub-solution.17
Appendix D presents the details of our analysis, which we summarize here. Propositions 9
and 10 show that U, the upper boundary of E, is a bounded viscosity solution of the upper
optimality equation. Lemma 16 shows that every bounded viscosity solution is a C1 function
with absolutely continuous derivative (so its second derivative exists almost everywhere). Finally,
Proposition 11 shows that U is the largest viscosity solution of (31), and that
U′′(φ) ∈ [H(φ,U(φ),U′(φ)), H∗(φ,U(φ),U′(φ))] a.e. (33)
17This is equivalent to Deﬁnition 2.2 in Crandall, Ishii, and Lions (1992).
24In particular, when H is continuous at (φ,U(φ),U′(φ)) then U satisﬁes (31) in the classical
sense.
We summarize our characterization in the following theorem.
Theorem 4. Assume Conditions 1 and 3 and that a public sequential equilibrium exists for
every prior. Then E is a compact-, convex-valued correspondence with an arcwise connected
graph. The upper boundary U of E is a C1 function with absolutely continuous derivative (so
U′′(φ) exists almost everywhere). Moreover, U is characterized as the maximal bounded function
that satisﬁes the diﬀerential inclusion
U′′(φ) ∈ [H(φ,U(φ),U′(φ)), H∗(φ,U(φ),U′(φ))] a.e., (34)
where the lower semi-continuous function H is deﬁned by (32) and H∗ denotes the upper semi-
continuous envelope of H. The lower boundary of E is characterized analogously.
To see an example of such equilibrium correspondence E(p), consider the following game,
related to our example of quality commitment. Suppose that the large player, a service provider,
chooses investment in quality at ∈ [0,1], where a∗ = 1 is the action of the behavioral type, and
each consumer chooses a service level bi
t ∈ [0,2]. The public signal about the large player’s
investment is
dXt = at dt + dZt.
The large player’s payoﬀ ﬂow is (¯ bt − at) dt and consumer i receives payoﬀ bi
t¯ bt dXt − bi
t dt.
The consumers’ payoﬀ functions capture positive network externalities: greater usage ¯ bt of the
service by other consumers allows each individual consumer to enjoy the service more.
The unique Nash equilibrium of the stage game is (0,0). The correspondence Ψ(φ,z) deﬁnes
the action of the normal type uniquely by
a =
(
0 if z ≤ r
1 − r/z otherwise.
(35)
The consumers’ actions are uniquely¯ b = 0 only when (1−φ)a+φa∗ < 1/2. If (1−φ)a+φa∗ ≥ 1/2
then the game among the consumers, who face a coordination problem, has two pure equilibria
with ¯ b = 0 and ¯ b = 2 (and one mixed equilibrium when (1 − φ)a + φa∗ > 1/2). Thus, the
correspondence Ψ(φ,z) is single-valued only on a subset of its domain.
How is this reﬂected in the equilibrium correspondence E(p)? Figure 4 displays the upper
boundary of E(p) for three discount rates r = 0.1, 0.2 and 0.5. The lower boundary for this
example is identically zero, because the game among the consumers has an equilibrium with
¯ b = 0.
For each discount rate, the upper boundary U is divided into three regions. In the region
near 0, where the upper boundary is a solid line, the correspondence Ψ(φ,φ(1 − φ)U′(φ)) is
single-valued and U satisﬁes the upper optimality equation in the classical sense. In the region
near 1, where the upper boundary is a dashed line, the correspondence Ψ is continuous and has












Payoﬀ of the normal type
Figure 4: The upper boundary of E(p).
















where a is given by (35) and 0 and 2 are two values of ¯ b that the correspondence Ψ returns. In
that range, the correspondence Ψ(φ,φ(1−φ)U′(φ)) is discontinuous in its arguments: if we lower
U(φ) slightly the equilibrium among the consumers with ¯ b = 2 disappears. These properties of
the upper boundary follow from the fact that it is the largest solution of the upper optimality
equation.
Remark 5. The assumption in Theorem 4 that a sequential equilibrium exists requires expla-
nation. First note that standard ﬁxed-point arguments do not apply to our games, because
the set of histories at any time t is uncountable.18 Second, observe that while the diﬀerential
inclusion (34) is guaranteed to have a solution under Conditions 1 and 3, this does not imply
the existence of a sequential equilibrium, since a measurable selection (a( ),¯ b( )) satisfying (30)
may fail to exist. However, if public randomization is allowed then existence is restored. In
the supplemental appendix Faingold and Sannikov (2007) we develop the formalism of public
randomization in continuous time and show that a sequential equilibrium in public randomized
18See Harris, Reny, and Robson (1995) for a related problem in the context of extensive-form games with
continuum action sets.
26strategies exists under Condition 1 and ﬁnite action sets (so that Condition 3 is automatically
satisﬁed).
27A Bounds on γ(a,¯ b,φ).
Throughout this appendix we will maintain Condition 1.
Lemma 2. There exist M > 0 and C > 0 such that whenever |β| ≤ M, and (a,¯ b,φ) satisﬁes
the incentive constraints (18), we have
|γ(a,¯ b,φ)| ≥ Cφ(1 − φ).
Proof. Consider the set Φ of 4-tuples (a,¯ b,φ,β) such that the incentive constraints (18) hold and
µ(a,¯ b) = µ(a∗,¯ b). Φ is a closed set that does not intersect the compact set A×∆(B)×[0,1]×{0},
and therefore the distance M′ > 0 between those two sets is positive. It follows that |β| ≥ M′
for any (a,¯ b,φ,β) ∈ Φ.
Now, let M = M′/2. Let Φ′ be the set of 4-tuples (a,¯ b,φ,β) such that the incentive
constraints (18) hold and |β| ≤ M. Φ′ is a compact set, and so the continuous function |µ(a∗,¯ b)−
µ(a,¯ b)| must reach a minimum C1 on Φ′. We have C1 > 0 because |β| ≥ 2M whenever |µ(a∗,¯ b)−
µ(a,¯ b)| = 0. Since for some k > 0, |σ(¯ b)   y| ≤ k|y| for all y and ¯ b, we have
|γ(a,¯ b,φ)| ≥ Cφ(1 − φ)
whenever |β| ≤ M and (a,¯ b,φ) satisﬁes the incentive constraints (18), where C = C1/k. This
concludes the proof of the lemma.
Lemma 3. For all ε > 0 there exists K > 0 such that for all φ ∈ [0,1] and u′ ∈ R,
|u′||γ(a,¯ b,φ)| ≥ K ,
whenever φ(1 − φ)|u′| ≥ ε and (a,¯ b) ∈ Ψ(φ,φ(1 − φ)u′).
Proof. As shown in the proof of Proposition 4, given Condition 1 there is no Bayesian Nash
equilibium (a,¯ b) of the static game with prior p > 0 in which µ(a,¯ b) = µ(a∗,¯ b).
If the statement of the lemma were false, there would exist a sequence (an,¯ bn,u′
n,φn), with
(an,¯ bn) ∈ Ψ(φn,φn(1 − φn)u′
n) and φn(1 − φn)|u′
n| ≥ ε for all n, for which |u′
n||γ(an,¯ bn,φn)|
converged to 0. Let (a,¯ b,φ) ∈ A×∆B ×[0,1] denote the limit of a convergent subsequence. By
upper hemi-continuity, (a,¯ b) is a BNE of the static game with prior φ. Hence, µ(a,¯ b)  = µ(a∗,¯ b)
and therefore liminfn |u′
n||γ(an,¯ bn,φn)| ≥ ε|σ(b)−1(µ(a,¯ b) − µ(a∗,¯ b))| > 0, a contradiction.
Lemma 4. For all M > 0 there exists C > 0 such that
|γ(a,¯ b,φ)| ≥ C φ(1 − φ),
whenever φ(1 − φ)|u′| < M and (a,¯ b) ∈ Ψ(φ,φ(1 − φ)u′).








whenever φ(1 − φ)|u′| ∈ (ε,M) and (a,¯ b) ∈ Ψ(φ,φ(1 − φ)u′).
28Therefore, Lemma 4 can be false only if
|γ(an,¯ bn,φn)|
φn(1 − φn)
= σ(¯ bn)−1(µ(a∗,¯ bn) − µ(an,¯ bn))
converges to 0 for some sequence (an,¯ bn,u′
n,φn), with (an,¯ bn) ∈ Ψ(φn,u′
n), φn ∈ (0,1), and
φn(1−φn)|u′
n| → 0. Let (a,¯ b,φ) ∈ A×∆(B)×[0,1] denote the limit of a convergent subsequence.
By upper hemi-continuity, (a,¯ b) is a BNE of the static game with prior φ. Hence, µ(a,¯ b)  =
µ(a∗,¯ b) and so |γ(an,¯ bn,φn)|/(φn(1 − φn)) cannot converge to 0, a contradiction.
Proof of Lemma 1. Pick any constant M > 0. Consider the set Φ0 of triples (a,b,β) ∈
A × ∆B × [0,1] × Rd that satisfy
a ∈ argmax
a′∈A
g(a′,b), b ∈ argmax
b′∈B
h(a,b′,¯ b), ∀b ∈ support¯ b, g(a,¯ b) ≥ ¯ v + ε (36)
and |β| ≤ M. Note that Φ0 is a compact set, as it is a closed subset of the compact space
A × ∆(B). Therefore, the continuous function |β| achieves its minimum δ on Φ0, and δ > 0
because of the condition g(a,¯ b) ≥ ¯ v + ε. It follows that |β| ≥ min(M,δ) > 0 for any triple
(a,b,β) satisfying conditions (36).
B Proof of Proposition 4.
Fix a public sequential equilibrium (at,¯ bt,φt) and ε > 0. Consider the function f1(W) =
eK1(W−g). Then, by Ito’s lemma, f1(Wt) has drift
K1eK1(W−g)(rWt − g(at,¯ bt)) + K2
1/2eK1(W−g)r2β2
t ,
which is always greater than or equal to
−K1eK1(¯ g−g)r(¯ g − g),
and greater than or equal to
−K1eK1(W−g)r(¯ g − g) + K2
1/2eK1(W−g)r2M2 > 1
when |βt| ≥ M (choosing K1 suﬃciently large).
Consider the function f2(φt) = K2(φ2




dt + γ(at,¯ bt,φt)dZn
t




(2φt − 2) + K2
|γ(at,¯ bt,φt)|2
2
2 = 3K2|γ(at,¯ bt,φt)|2 ≥ 0
When K2 is suﬃciently large, then the drift of f2(φt) is greater than or equal to K1eK1(¯ g−g)r(¯ g−
g) + 1, whenever φt ∈ [ε,1 − ε] and |βt| ≤ M, so that |γ(a,¯ b,φ)| ≥ Cφ(1 − φ) by Lemma 2.
29It follows that until the stopping time τ when φt hits an endpoint of [ε,1 − ε], the drift of
f1(Wt) + f2(φt) is greater than or equal to 1.
But then for some constant K3, since f1 is bounded on [g, ¯ g] and f2 is bounded on [ε,1−ε],
it follows that for all t
K3 ≥ E[f1(Wmin(τ,t)) + f2(φmin(τ,t))] ≥ f1(W0) + f2(φ0) +
Z t
0
Prob(τ ≥ s) ds
and so Prob(τ ≥ s) must converge to 0 as s → ∞.
But then φt must converge to 0 or 1 with probability 1, and it cannot be 1 with positive
probability if the type is normal. This completes the proof of Proposition 4.
C Appendix for Section 6.
Throughout this appendix we will maintain Conditions 1 and 2.
C.1 Existence of a bounded solution of the optimality equation.
In this subsection we will prove the following Proposition.
Proposition 6. The optimality equation has at least one solution that stays within the interval
of all feasible payoﬀs of the large player on (0,1).
The proof of Proposition 6 relies on several lemmas.
Lemma 5. The solutions to the optimality equation exist locally for φ ∈ (0,1) (that is, until a
blowup point when |U(φ)| or |U′(φ)| become unboundedly large) and are unique and continuous
in initial conditions.
Proof. First, implies that the right-hand side of optimality equation is locally Lipschitz. It
follows directly from the standard theorem on existence, uniqueness and continuity of solutions
of ordinary diﬀerential equations in initial conditions, as the right hand side of the optimality
equation is locally Lipschitz-continuous, by Lemma 4.
Lemma 6. Consider a solution U(φ) of the optimality equation. If there is a blowup at point
φ1 ∈ (0,1) then both |U(φ)| and |U′(φ)| become unboundedly large near φ1.
Proof. By Lemma 3, there exists a constant k > 0 such that
|U′(φ)||γ(Ψ(φ,φ(1 − φ)U′(φ)),φ)| ≥ k > 0
in a neighborhood of φ1, when |U′(φ)| is bounded away from 0. Suppose, towards a contradiction,
that U(φ) is bounded from above by K near φ1. Without loss of generality assume that U′(φ)
(as opposed to −U′(φ)) becomes arbitrarily large near φ1, and that φ1 is the right endpoint
of the domain of the solution U. Then let us pick points φ3 < φ2 < φ1 such that U′(φ) stays
positive on the interval (φ3,φ2) and U′(φ2) − U′(φ3) is suﬃciently large.
Consider the case when U′(φ) is monotonic on (φ2,φ3), and let us parameterize the interval













2r(U(φ) − g(Ψ(φ,φ(1 − φ)U′(φ))))
|γ(Ψ(φ,φ(1 − φ)U′(φ)),φ)|2 ≤ k1U′(φ) + k2U′(φ)2
for some constants k1 and k2 that depend on φ1, K and the range of stage-game payoﬀs of the
large player, so that ξ(u′) ≥ 1/(k1 + k2u′).
Then






1/(k1 + k2u′)du′ (37)
This quantity grows arbitrarily large, leading to a contradiction, when U′(φ3) − U′(φ2) gets
large while U′(φ2) stays ﬁxed (this can be always guaranteed even if U′(φ) ﬂips sign many times
near φ1.)
When U′(φ) is not monotonic on (φ2,φ3), a conclusion similar to (37) can be reached by
splitting the integral into subintervals where U′(φ) is increasing (on which the bound (37) holds)
and the rest of the subintervals (on which U(φ) is increasing).
One consequence of Lemma 6 is that starting from any initial condition with φ0 ∈ (0,1) the
solution of the optimality equation exists until φ = 0 and 1, or until U(φ) exits the range of
feasible payoﬀs of the large player.
Lemma 7. (Monotonicity) If two solutions U1 and U2 of the optimality equation satisfy U1(φ0) ≤
U2(φ0) and U′
1(φ0) ≤ U′
2(φ0) with at least one strict inequality, then U1(φ) ≤ U2(φ) and
U′
1(φ) ≤ U′
2(φ) for all φ > φ0 until the blowup point. Similarly, if U1(φ0) ≤ U2(φ0) and
U′
1(φ0) ≥ U′
2(φ0) with at least one strict inequality, then U1(φ) < U2(φ) and U′
1(φ) > U′
2(φ) for
all φ < φ0 until the blowup point.




2(φ) for all φ > φ0








2(φ1) by continuity and U1(φ1) < U2(φ1) since U1(φ0) ≤ U2(φ0) and




1(φ1 − ε) > U′
2(φ1 − ε) for suﬃciently small ε, which contradicts the deﬁnition of φ1.
For the case when U1(φ0) < U2(φ0) and U′
1(φ0) = U′





2(φ) on (φ0,φ0 +ε), and the argument proceeds as
above.
The monotonicity argument for φ < φ0 when U1(φ0) ≤ U2(φ0) and U′
1(φ0) ≥ U′
2(φ0) with at
least one strict inequality is similar.
31Proof of Proposition 6. Denote by [g,¯ g] the interval of all feasible payoﬀs of the large player.
Fix φ0 ∈ (0,1).
(a) Note that if |U′(φ0)| is suﬃciently large then the solution U must exit the interval [g,¯ g]
in a neighborhood of φ0. This conclusion can be derived using an inequality similar to (37):
|U′(φ)| cannot become small near φ0 without a change in U(φ) of
R |U′(φ0)|
|U′(φ)| 1/(k1 + k2|x|)dx.
(b) Also, note that if a solution U reaches the boundary of the region of feasible payoﬀs, it
must exit the region and never reenter. Indeed, it is easy to see from the optimality equation
that when U′(φ) = 0, U′′(φ) ≥ 0 if U(φ) ≥ ¯ g, and U′′(φ) ≤ 0 if U(φ) ≤ g. Therefore, U′(φ)
never changes its sign when U(φ) is outside (g,¯ g).
(c) For a given level U(φ0) = u, consider solutions of the optimality equation for φ ≤ φ0 for
diﬀerent values of U′(φ0). When U′(φ0) is suﬃciently large, the resulting solution will reach g
at some point φ1 ∈ (0,φ0) by (a). As U′(φ0) decreases, φ1 also decreases by Lemma 7, until for
some value U′(φ0) = L(u) the solution never reaches the lower boundary of the set of feasible
payoﬀs for any φ1 ∈ (0,φ0). Note that this solution never reaches the upper boundary of the set
of feasible payoﬀs for any φ1 ∈ (0,φ0) : if it did, then the solution with slope U′(φ0) = L(u) + ε
would also reach the upper boundary by Lemma 5, and by (b) it would never reach the lower
boundary. We conclude that the solution of the optimality equation with boundary conditions
U(φ0) = u and U′(φ0) = L(u) stays within the range of feasible payoﬀs for all φ1 ∈ (0,φ0).
(d) Similarly, deﬁne R(u) as the smallest value of U′(φ0) for which the resulting solution
never reaches the largest feasible payoﬀ of the large player at any φ ∈ (φ0,1). Then the solution
of the optimality equation with boundary conditions U(φ0) = u and U′(φ0) = R(u) stays within
the range of feasible payoﬀs for all φ1 ∈ (φ0,1), by the same logic as in (c).
(e) Now, Lemma 7 implies that L(u) is increasing in u and R(u) is decreasing in u. Moreover,
L(g) ≤ 0 ≤ L(¯ g) and R(g) ≥ 0 ≥ R(¯ g). Therefore, there exists a value of u for which L(u) =
R(u). The solution to the optimality equation with boundaryconditions U(φ0) = u and U′(φ0) =
L(u) = R(u) must stay within the interval of feasible payoﬀs for all φ ∈ (0,1).
This completes the proof of Proposition 6.
C.2 Regularity conditions at the boundary and uniqueness.
Proposition 7. If U is a bounded solution of equation (22)on (0,1), then U satisﬁes the fol-
lowing boundary conditions at p = 0,1:
lim
φ→p
U(φ) = g(Ψ(p,0)), lim
φ→p
φ(1 − φ)U′(φ) = 0, lim
φ→p
φ2(1 − φ)2U′′(φ) = 0. (38)
Proof. Direct from Lemmas 10, 11 and 12 below. Lemmas 8 and 9 are intermediate steps.
Lemma 8. If U : (0,1) → R is a bounded solution of the optimality equation, then U has
bounded variation.
Proof. Suppose there exists a bounded solution U of the optimality equation with unbounded
variation near p = 0 (the case p = 1 is similar). Then let φn be a decreasing sequence of
consecutive local maxima and minima of U, such that φn is a local maximum for n odd and a
local minimum for n even.
32Then for n odd we have U′(φn) = 0 and U′′(φn) ≤ 0. From the optimality equation it
follows that g(Ψ(φn,0)) ≥ U(φn). Likewise, for n even we have g(Ψ(φn,0)) ≤ U(φn). Thus, the
total variation of g(Ψ(φ,0)) on (0,φ1] is no smaller than the total variation of U and therefore
g(Ψ(φ,0)) has unbounded variation near zero. However, this is a contradiction, since g(Ψ(φ,0))
is Lipschitz continuous.
Lemma 9. Let U : (0,1) → R be a bounded, continuously diﬀerentiable function. Then
liminf
φ→0





(1 − φ)U′(φ) ≤ 0 ≤ limsup
φ→1
(1 − φ)U′(φ).
Proof. Suppose, towards a contradiction, that liminfφ→0 φU′(φ) > 0 (the case limsupφ→0 φU′(φ) <
0 is analogous). Then for some c > 0 and ¯ φ > 0, for all φ ∈ (0, ¯ φ], φU′(φ) ≥ c ⇒ U′(φ) ≥ c/φ.
But then U cannot be bounded since the anti-derivative of 1/φ, logφ, tends to ∞ as φ → 0, a
contradiction. The proof for the case φ → 1 is analogous.
Lemma 10. If U is a bounded solution of the optimality equation, then limφ→p φ(1−φ)U′(φ) = 0
for p ∈ {0,1}.
Proof. Suppose, towards a contradiction, that φU′(φ)   0 as φ → 0. Then, by Lemma 9,
liminf
φ→0
φU′(φ) ≤ 0 ≤ limsup
φ→0
φU′(φ),
with at least one strict inequality. Without loss of generality, assume limsupφ→0 φU′(φ) > 0.
Hence there exist constants 0 < k < K, such that φU′(φ) crosses levels k and K inﬁnitely many
times in a neighborhood of 0.
By Lemma 4 there exists C > 0 such that
|γ(a,¯ b,φ)| ≥ C φ,
whenever φU′(φ) ∈ (k,K) and φ ∈ (0, 1




for some constant L > 0. This bound implies that for all φ ∈ (0, 1
2) with φU′(φ) ∈ (k,K), we
have
|(φU′(φ))′| ≤ |φU′′(φ)| + |U′(φ)| = (1 +
|φU′′(φ)|
|U′(φ)|









It follows that on every interval where φU′(φ) crosses k and stays in (k,K) until crossing K,
the total variation of U is at least (K − k)/(1 + L/k). Since this happens inﬁnitely many times
in a neighborhood of φ = 0, function U must have unbounded variation in that neighborhood,
a contradiction (by virtue of Lemma 8.)
The proof that limφ→1(1 − φ)U′(φ) = 0 is analogous.





Proof. First, by Lemma 8, U must have bounded variation and so the limφ→p U(φ) exists.
Consider p = 0 and assume, towards a contradiction, that limφ→0 U(φ) = U0 < g(aN,bN), where
(aN,bN) = Ψ(0,0) is the Nash equilibrium of the stage game (the proof for the reciprocal case is
similar). By Lemma 10, limφ→0 φU′(φ) = 0, which implies that the function Ψ(φ,φ(1−φ)U′(φ))





2r(U(φ) − g(Ψ(φ,φ(1 − φ)U′(φ)))






where h(φ) is a continuous function that converges to
2r(U0 − g(aN,bN))
|σ(bN)−1(µ(a∗,bN) − µ(aN,bN))|2 < 0.
as φ → 0. Since U′(φ) = o(1/φ) by Lemma 9, it follows that for some ¯ φ > 0, there exists a




for all φ ∈ (0, ¯ φ). But then U cannot be bounded since the second-order anti-derivative of 1/φ2
(−logφ) tends to ∞ as φ → 0.
The proof for the case p = 1 is analogous.
Lemma 12. If U : (0,1) → R is a bounded solution of the optimality equation, then
lim
φ→p
φ2(1 − φ)2U′′(φ) = 0, for p ∈ {0,1}.
Proof. Consider p = 1. Fix an arbitrary M > 0 and choose φ ∈ (0,1) so that (1−φ)|U′(φ)| < M
for all φ ∈ (φ,1). By Lemma 4 there exists C > 0 such that |γ(Ψ(φ,φ(1−φ)U′(φ)),φ)| ≥ C(1−φ)
for all φ ∈ (φ,1). Hence, by the optimality equation, we have for all φ ∈ (φ,1):
(1 − φ)2|U′′(φ)| ≤ 2(1 − φ)|U′(φ)| + (1 − φ)2 2r|U(φ) − g(Ψ(φ,φ(1 − φ)U′(φ)))|
|γ(Ψ(φ,φ(1 − φ)U′(φ)),φ)|2
≤ 2(1 − φ)|U′(φ)| + 2rC−2|U(φ) − g(Ψ(φ,φ(1 − φ)U′(φ)))| −→ 0,
as required. The case p = 0 is analogous.
Proposition 8. The optimality equation has a unique bounded solution over the interval (0,1).
Proof. Proposition 6 implies that at least one such solution U : (0,1) → R exists. Suppose V
were another bounded solution. Assuming that V (φ) > U(φ) for some φ ∈ (0,1), let φ0 be
the point where the diﬀerence V (φ0) − U(φ0) is maximized. It follows from Proposition 7 that
φ0 ∈ (0,1). But then by Lemma 7 the diﬀerence V (φ) − U(φ) must be increasing for φ > φ0, a
contradiction.
34C.3 A uniform lower bound on volatility.
Lemma 13. Let U : (0,1) → R be the unique bounded solution of the optimality equation and
let d and f be the continuous functions deﬁned by:
d(a,¯ b,φ) =
(
rU(φ) − rg(a,¯ b) −
|γ(a,b,φ)|2
1−φ U′(φ) − 1
2|γ(a,b,φ)|2U′′(φ) : φ ∈ (0,1)
0 : φ = 0 or 1
(39)
and








¯ b ∈ argmax
b′∈B
u(b′,¯ b) + v(b′,¯ b)   µφ(a,¯ b), for all b ∈ support¯ b,
(41)
either d(a,¯ b,φ) > −ε or f(a,¯ b,φ,β) ≥ δ.
Proof. Since φ(1 − φ)U′(φ) is bounded (by Lemma 10) and there exists c > 0 such that |σ(¯ b)  
y| ≥ c|y| for all y ∈ Rd and ¯ b ∈ ∆B, there exist constants M > 0 and m > 0 such that
|f(a,¯ b,φ,β)| > m for all β ∈ Rd with |β| > M.
Consider the set Φ of 4-tuples (a,b,φ,β) ∈ A×∆B×[0,1]×Rd with |β| ≤ M that satisfy (41)
and d(a,¯ b,φ) ≤ −ε. Since U satisﬁes the boundary conditions (38), d is a continuous function
and Φ is a closed subset of the compact set
{(a,b,φ,β) ∈ A × ∆B × [0,1] × Rd : |β| ≤ M},
Φ is compact.19
Since U satisﬁes the boundary conditions (38), the function |f(a,¯ b,φ,β)| is continuous.
Hence, it achieves its minimum, η, on Φ. We have η > 0, because, as we argued in the proof of
Theorem 3, d(a,¯ b,φ) = 0 whenever f(a,¯ b,φ,β) = 0. It follows that for all (a,¯ b,φ,β) that satisfy
(41), either d(a,¯ b,φ) > −ε or |f(a,¯ b,φ,β)| ≥ min(m,η) ≡ δ.
C.4 Comparative statics for the quality game.
The correspondence Ψα(φ,z) for our example is given by
a =
(
0 if z ≤ r,
1 − r/z otherwise,
and b =
(
0 if φa∗ + (1 − φ)a ≤ 1/(4α),
4 − 1/(α(φa∗ + (1 − φ)a)) otherwise.
Note that γ(Ψα(φ,z),φ) = φ(1 − φ)(a∗ − a) does not depend on α for our example, and that
g(Ψα(φ,z)) = b − a weakly increases in α. Consider parameter values α > α′ > 0, and let us
show that the large player’s payoﬀs for these parameters satisfy
Uα(φ) ≥ Uα′
(φ) (42)
19Since B is compact, the set ∆(B) is compact in the topology of weak convergence of probability measures.
35for all φ ∈ (0,1). Note that
Uα(p) = g(Ψα(p,0)) > g(Ψα′
(p,0)) = Uα′
(p)
for p = 0,1. Suppose that (42) fails for some φ ∈ (0,1). Letting φ0 be the point where
Uα′
(φ) − Uα(φ) is maximized, we have
Uα′
(φ0) > Uα(φ0), Uα′
(φ0)′ = Uα(φ0)′ = z and Uα′
(φ0)′′ ≤ Uα(φ0)′′.















a contradiction (recall that γ(Ψα′
(φ,z),φ) = γ(Ψα(φ,z),φ)).
D Appendix for Section 7.
Throughout this appendix, we will maintain Conditions 1 and 3. Write U and L for the upper
and lower boundaries of the correspondence E respectively, that is,
U(p) = supE(p), L(p) = inf E(p)
for all p ∈ [0,1].
Proposition 9. The upper boundary U : (0,1) → R is a viscosity sub-solution of the Upper
Optimality equation.
Proof. If U is not a sub-solution, there exists q ∈ (0,1) and a C2-function V : (0,1) → R such
that 0 = (V − U∗)(q) < (V − U∗)(φ) for all φ ∈ (0,1) \ {q}, and
H∗(q,V (q),V ′(q)) = H∗(q,U∗(q),V ′(q)) > V ′′(q).
Since H∗ is lower semi-continuous, U∗ is upper semi-continuous and V > U∗ on (0,1) \ {q},
there exist ε and δ > 0 small enough such that for all φ ∈ [q − ε,q + ε],
H(φ,V (φ) − δ,V ′(φ)) > V ′′(φ), (43)
V (q − ε) − δ > U∗(q − ε) ≥ U(q − ε) and V (q + ε) − δ > U∗(q + ε) ≥ U(q + ε). (44)
Figure 5 displays the conﬁguration of functions U∗ and V − δ. Fix a pair (φ0,W0) ∈ GraphE
with φ0 ∈ (q−ε,q+ε) and W0 > V (φ0)−δ. (Such pair (φ0,W0) exists because V (q) = U∗(q) and
U∗ is u.s.c.) Let (at,¯ bt,φt) be a sequential equilibrium that attains the pair (φ0,W0). Denoting
by (Wt) the continuation value of the normal type, we have
dWt = r(Wt − g(at,¯ bt)) dt + rβt   (dXt − µ(at,¯ bt) dt)
for some β ∈ L∗. Next, we will show that, with positive probability, eventually Wt becomes
greater than U(φt), leading to a contradiction since U is the upper boundary of E.
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Figure 5: A viscosity sub-solution.
Let Dt = Wt − (V (φt) − δ). By Itˆ o’s formula,






)dt + γtV ′(φt)dZn
t ,

















Therefore, so long as Dt ≥ D0/2,
(a) φt cannot exit the interval [q − ε,q + ε] by (44), and
(b) there exists η > 0 such that either the drift of Dt is greater than rD0/2 or the norm of
the volatility of Dt is greater than η, because of inequality (43) using an argument similar
to the proof of Lemma 13.20
This implies that with positive probability Dt stays above D0/2 and eventually reaches any
arbitrarily large level. Since payoﬀs are bounded, this leads to a contradiction. We conclude
that U must be a sub-solution of the upper optimality equation.
20While the required argument is similar to the one found in the proof of Lemma 13, there are important
diﬀerences, so we outline them here. First, the functions d and f from Lemma 13 must be re-deﬁned, with the
test function V replacing U in the new deﬁnition. Second, the deﬁnition of the compact set Φ also requires change:
Φ would now be the set of all (a,¯ b,φ,β) with φ ∈ [q − ε,q + ǫ] and |β| ≤ M such that the incentive constraints
(41) are satisﬁed and d(a,¯ b,φ) ≤ 0. Since φ is bounded away from 0 and 1, the boundary conditions will play no
role here. Finally, note that U is assumed to satisfy the optimality equation in the lemma, while here V satisﬁes
the strict inequality 43. Accordingly, we need to modify the last part of that proof as follows: f(a,¯ b,φ,β) = 0
implies d(a,¯ b,φ) > 0, and therefore we have η > 0.
37The next lemma is an auxiliary result used in the proof of Proposition 10 below.
Lemma 14. The correspondence E of public sequential equilibrium payoﬀs is convex-valued and
has an arc-connected graph.
Proof. We shall ﬁrst prove that E is convex-valued. Fix p ∈ (0,1), w∗, w∗ ∈ E(p) (with w∗ > w∗)
and v ∈ (w∗,w∗). We will prove that v ∈ E(p). Consider the set V = {(φ,w)|w = α|φ −p|+ v}
where α > 0 is chosen large enough so that α|φ − p| + v > U(φ) for all φ suﬃciently close
to 0 and 1. Let (φt,Wt)t≥0 be the belief / continuation value process of a public sequential
equilibrium that yields the normal type a payoﬀ of w∗. Let τ ≡ inf{t > 0|(φt,Wt) ∈ V}.
Proposition 4 implies that τ < ∞ almost surely. If φτ = p with probability 1, then Wτ = v
and nothing remains to be shown. Otherwise, by the martingale property, we have φτ < p
with positive probability and φτ > p also with positive probability. Hence, there exists a
continuous curve C ⊂ graph E with endpoints (p1,w1) and (p2,w2) such that p1 < p < p2,
and for all (φ,w) ∈ C we have w > v and φ ∈ (p1,p2). Pick 0 < ε < p − p1. We will now
construct a continuous curve C′ ⊂ graph E|(0,p1+ε] that has (p1,w1) as an endpoint and satisﬁes
inf {φ|∃w s.t. (φ,w) ∈ C′} = 0. Fix a public sequential equilibrium of the dynamic game with
prior p1 that yields the normal type a payoﬀ of w1. Let Pn denote the probability measure over
the sample paths of X induced by the strategy of the normal type. By Proposition 4 we have
φt → 0 Pn-almost surely. Moreover, since (φt) is a supermartingale under Pn, the maximal











Choose a sample path (¯ φt, ¯ Wt) with the property that ¯ φt → 0 and ¯ φt ≤ p1 + ε for all t ≥ 0.
Deﬁne the curve C′ as the image of the sample path t  → (¯ φt, ¯ Wt). By a similar argument we can
construct a continuous curve C′′ ⊂ Graph E|[p2−ε,1) that has (p2,w2) as an endpoint and satisﬁes
sup{φ|∃w s.t. (φ,w) ∈ C′′} = 1.
Thus, we have constructed a continuous curve C∗ ≡ C′ ∪C ∪C′′ ⊂ GraphE|(0,1) that projects
onto (0,1) and satisﬁes inf {w|(p,w) ∈ C∗} > v. By a similar argument, there exists a continuous
curve C∗ ⊂ GraphE|(0,1) that projects onto (0,1) and satisﬁes sup{w|(p,w) ∈ C∗} < v.
Let φ  → (a(φ),¯ b(φ)) be a measurable selection from the correspondence of static Bayesian






with initial condition φ0 = p.21 Let (Wt) be the unique solution of
dWt = r(Wt − g(a(φt),¯ b(φt)))dt
with initial condition W0 = v, up to the stopping time T > 0 when (φt,Wt) ﬁrst hits either C∗
or C∗. Deﬁne a strategy proﬁle (at,¯ bt) as follows: for t < T, (at,¯ bt) ≡ (a(φt),¯ b(φt)); from t = T
21Condition 1 ensures that γ(a(φt),¯ b(φt),φt) is bounded away from zero, hence standard results for exis-
tence/uniqueness of weak solutions apply.
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Figure 6: A viscosity super-solution.
onwards (at,¯ bt) follows an equilibrium of the game with prior φT. By Theorem 1 (at,¯ bt,φt) is a
sequential equilibrium of the game with prior p that yields the normal type a payoﬀ of v. Hence
v ∈ E(p), concluding the proof that E is convex-valued.
We will now prove that the graph of E is arc-connected. Fix p < q, v ∈ E(p) and w ∈ E(q).
Consider a sequential equilibrium of the game with prior q that yields the normal type a payoﬀ
of w. Since φt → 0, there exists a continuous curve C ⊂ graph E with endpoints (q,w) and (p,v′)
for some v′ ∈ E(p). Since E is convex-valued, the straight line C′ connecting (p,v) to (p,v′) is
contained in the graph of E. Hence C ∪C′ is a continuous curve connecting (q,w) and (p,v) that
is contained in the graph of E, concluding the proof that E has an arc-connected graph.
Proposition 10. The upper boundary U : (0,1) → R is a viscosity super-solution of the Upper
Optimality equation.
Proof. If U is not a super-solution, there exists q ∈ (0,1) and a C2-function V : (0,1) → R such
that 0 = (U∗ − V )(q) < (U∗ − V )(φ) for all φ ∈ (0,1) \ {q}, and
H∗(q,V (q),V ′(q)) = H∗(q,U∗(q),V ′(q)) < V ′′(q).
Since H∗ is upper semi-continuous, U∗ is lower semi-continuous and U∗ > V on (0,1)\{q}, there
exist ε, δ > 0 small enough such that for all φ ∈ [q − ε,q + ε],
H(φ,V (φ) + δ,V ′(φ)) < V ′′(φ), (45)
V (q − ε) + δ < U(q − ε) and V (q + ε) + δ < U(q + ε). (46)
Figure 6 displays the conﬁguration of functions U∗ and V + δ. Fix a pair (φ0,W0) with
φ0 ∈ (q−ε,q+ε) and U(φ0) < W0 < V (φ0)+δ. We will now construct a sequential equilibrium
39that attains (φ0,W0), and this will lead to a contradiction since U(φ0) < W0 and U is the upper
boundary of E.
Let φ  → (a(φ),¯ b(φ)) ∈ Ψ(φ,φ(1 − φ)V ′(φ)) be a measurable selection of action proﬁles that
minimize







over all (a,¯ b) ∈ Ψ(φ,φ(1 − φ)V ′(φ)), for each φ ∈ (0,1).




dt + γ(a(φt),¯ b(φt),φt)   dZn
t (48)
on the interval [q − ε,q + ε], with initial condition φ0.22 Next, let (Wt) be the unique strong
solution of
dWt = r(Wt − g(a(φt),¯ b(φt)))dt + γ(a(φt),¯ b(φt),φt)V ′(φt)   dZn
t , (49)
with initial condition W0, until the stopping time when φt ﬁrst exits [q − ε,q + ε].23
Then, by Ito’s formula, the process Dt = Wt − V (φt) − δ has zero volatility and drift given
by









By (45) and the deﬁnition of (a(φ),¯ b(φ)), the drift of Dt is strictly negative so long as Dt ≤ 0
and φt ∈ [q − ε,q + ε]. (Note that D0 < 0.) Therefore, the process (φt,Wt) remains under the
curve (φt,V (φt) + δ) from time zero onwards so long as φt ∈ [q − ε,q + ε].
By Lemma 14 there exists a continuous path C ⊂ E|[q−ε,q+ε] that connects the points (q −
ε,U(q −ε)) and (q +ε,U(q +ε)). By (46), the path C and the function V +δ bound a region in
[q − ε,q + ε] × R that contains (φ0,W0), as shown in Figure 6. Since the drift of Dt is strictly
negative while φt ∈ [q −ε,q +ε], the pair (φt,Wt) eventually hits the path C at a stopping time
τ < ∞ before φt exits the interval [q − ε,q + ε].
We will now construct a sequential equilibrium of the repeated game with prior φ0 that
yields the normal type payoﬀ W0. Consider the strategy proﬁle and belief process that coincides
with (a(φt),¯ b(φt),φt) up to time τ, and follows a sequential equilibrium of the game with prior
φτ at all times after τ. Since Wt is bounded, (a(φt),¯ b(φt)) ∈ Ψ(φt,φt(1 − φt)V ′(φt)), and the
processes (φt,Wt) follow (48) and (49), Theorem 1 implies that the strategy proﬁle (a(φt),¯ b(φt))
and belief process (φt) form a sequential equilibrium of the game with prior φ0. It follows that
W0 ∈ E(φ0), leading to a contradiction since W0 > U(φ0). This contradiction shows that U
must be a super-solution of the upper optimality equation.
Lemma 15. Every bounded viscosity solution of the upper optimality equation is locally Lipschitz
continuous.
22Existence of a weak solution on a closed sub-interval of (0,1) follows from the fact that V
′ is bounded and
therefore γ is bounded away from zero (Lemma 4). Uniqueness is also granted, because φt is a one-dimensional
process (see Remark 4.32 on Karatzas and Shreve (1991, p. 327)).
23Existence and uniqueness of a strong solution follows from the Lipschitz and linear growth conditions in W,
and the boundedness of γ(a(φ),¯ b(φ),φ)V
′(φ) on [q − ε,q + ε].
40Proof. En route to a contradiction, suppose U is a bounded viscosity solution that is not locally
Lipschitz. That is, for some p ∈ (0,1) and ε ∈ (0, 1
2) satisfying [p − 2ε,p + 2ε] ⊂ (0,1) the
restriction of U to [p − ε,p + ε] is not Lipschitz continuous. Let M = sup |U|. By Lemmas 3
and 4 there exists K > 0 such that for all (φ,u,u′) ∈ [p − 2ε,p + 2ε] × [−M,M] × R,
|H∗(φ,u,u′)| ≤ K(1 + |u′|2), (50)






Hereafter we will assume φ1 > φ0 and U∗(φ1) > U∗(φ0). The proof for the reciprocal case is
analogous and will be omitted.
Let V : I → R be the solution of the diﬀerential equation
V ′′(φ) = 2K(1 + V ′(φ)2), (52)
with initial conditions given by




where the interval I is the maximal domain of V .
We claim V has the following two properties:
(a) There exists φ∗ ∈ I ∩ (p − 2ε,p + 2ε) such that V (φ∗) = −M and φ∗ < φ0. In particular,
φ0 ∈ I.
(b) V (φ0) > U∗(φ0).
We shall ﬁrst prove property (a). For all φ ∈ I such that V ′(φ) > 1, we have V ′′(φ) <
4KV ′(φ)2 or, equivalently, (logV ′)′(φ) < 4KV ′(φ), which yields
V (ˆ φ) − V (˜ φ) >
1
4K
(log(V ′(ˆ φ)) − log(V ′(˜ φ))), ∀ˆ φ, ˜ φ ∈ I s.t. V ′(ˆ φ) > V ′(˜ φ) > 1. (54)
By (51) and (53), we have 1




(log(V ′(φ1)) − log(V ′(˜ φ))) = 2M . (55)
Since V ′(˜ φ) > 1, it follows from (54) that V (φ1) − V (˜ φ) > 2M and so V (˜ φ) < −M. Since
V (φ1) > U(φ0) ≥ −M, there exists some φ∗ ∈ (˜ φ,φ1) such that V (φ∗) = −M. Moreover φ∗
must belong to (p − 2ε,p + 2ε), because the convexity of V implies
φ1 − φ∗ <










log(V ′(φ1)) − 8KM
< ε,
where the equality follows from (55) and the rightmost inequality follows from (51). Finally, we






V (φ1) − V (φ∗)
φ1 − φ∗ ,
41which would violate the strict convexity of V . This concludes the proof of property (a).
Turning to property (b), the strict convexity of V and the initial conditions (53) imply
U∗(φ1) − V (φ0)
φ1 − φ0
=
V (φ1) − V (φ0)
φ1 − φ0




and therefore V (φ0) > U∗(φ0), as required.
Deﬁne
L = max{V (φ) − U∗(φ)|φ ∈ [φ∗,φ1]}.
By property (b), we have L > 0. Let ˆ φ be a point at which the maximum above is attained.
Since V (φ∗) = −M and V (φ1) = U∗(φ1), we have ˆ φ ∈ (φ∗,φ1) and therefore V − L is a test
function that satisﬁes
U∗(ˆ φ) = V (ˆ φ) − L,
and
U∗(φ) ≥ V (φ) − L for every φ ∈ (φ∗,φ1).
Since U is a viscosity supersolution,
V ′′(ˆ φ) ≤ H∗(ˆ φ,V (ˆ φ) − L,V ′(ˆ φ)),
and hence, by (50),
V ′′(ˆ φ) ≤ K(1 + V ′(ˆ φ)2) < 2K(1 + V ′(ˆ φ)2)),
which is a contradiction, since by construction V satisﬁes equation (52).
Lemma 16. Every bounded viscosity solution of the upper optimality equation is continuously
diﬀerentiable with absolutely continuous derivatives.
Proof. Let U : (0,1) → R be a bounded solution of the upper optimality equation. By Lemma 15,
U is locally Lipschitz and hence diﬀerentiable almost everywhere. We will now show that U is
diﬀerentiable. Fix φ ∈ (0,1). Since U is locally Lipschitz, there exist δ > 0 and k > 0 such that
for every p ∈ (φ − δ,φ + δ) and every smooth test function V : (φ − δ,φ + δ) → R satisfying
V (p) = U(p) and V ≥ U we have
|V ′(p)| ≤ k.
It follows from Lemma 4 that there exists some M > 0 such that
|H(p,U(p),V ′(p))| ≤ M
for every p ∈ (φ−δ,φ+δ) and every smooth test function V satisfying V ≥ U and V (p) = U(p).
Let us now show that for all ε ∈ (0,δ) and ε′ ∈ (0,ε)









< Mε′(ε − ε′). (56)
If not, for example if the second inequality fails, then we can choose K > 0 such that the C2
function (a parabola)









+ Mε′(ε − ε′) + K
42is completely above U(φ+ε′) except for a tangency point at ε′′ ∈ (0,ε). But this contradicts the
fact that U is a viscosity subsolution, since f′′(φ+ε′′) = −2M < H(φ+ε′′,U(p+ε′′),U′(φ+ε′′)).




U(φ + ε′) − U(φ)
ε′ −




￿ ￿ ≤ Mε.
It follows that as ε converges to 0 from above,
U(φ + ε) − U(φ)
ε
converges to a limit U′(φ+). Similarly, if ε converges to 0 from below, the quotient above
converges to a limit U′(φ−).
We claim that U′(φ+) = U′(φ−). Otherwise, if for example U′(φ+) > U′(φ−), then the
function
f1(φ + ε′) = U(φ) + ε′U′(φ−) + U′(φ+)
2
+ Mε′2
is below U in a neighborhood of φ, except for a tangency point at φ. But this leads to a
contradiction, because f′′
1(φ) = 2M > H(φ,U(φ),U′(φ)) and U is a super-solution. Therefore
U′(φ+) = U′(φ−) and we conclude that U is diﬀerentiable at every φ ∈ (0,1).
We will now show that U′ is locally Lipschitz. Fix φ ∈ (0,1) and, arguing just as we did
above, choose δ > 0 and M > 0 so that
|H(p,U(p),V ′(p))| ≤ M
for every p ∈ (φ−δ,φ + δ) and every smooth test function V satisfying V (p) = U(p) and either
V ≥ U or V ≤ U. We aﬃrm that for any p ∈ (φ − δ,φ + δ) and ε ∈ (0,δ)
|U′(p) − U′(p + ε)| ≤ 2Mε.
If not, e.g. if U′(p + ε) > U′(p) + 2Mε for some p ∈ (φ − δ,φ + δ) and ε ∈ (0,δ), then the test
function
f2(p + ε′) =
ε′
ε
U(p + ε) +
ε − ε′
ε
U(p) − Mε′(ε − ε′)
must be above U at some ε′ ∈ (0,ε) (since f′
2(p + ε) − f′
2(p) = 2Mε.) Therefore, there exists a
constant K > 0 such that f2(p + ε′) − K stays below U for ε′ ∈ [0,ε], except for a tangency at
some ε′′ ∈ (0,ε). But then
f′′
2(φ + ε′′) = 2M > H(φ + ε′′,U(φ + ε′′),U′(φ + ε′′)),
contradicting the fact that U is a viscosity super-solution.
Proposition 11. The upper boundary U is a continuously diﬀerentiable function, with absolutely
continuous derivatives. In addition, U is characterized as the maximal bounded solution of the
following diﬀerential inclusion:
U′′(φ) ∈ [H(φ,U(φ),U′(φ)), H∗(φ,U(φ),U′(φ))] a.e.. (57)
43Proof. First, note that by Propositions 9, 10 and 16, the upper boundary U is a diﬀerentiable
function with absolutely continuous derivative that solves the diﬀerential inclusion (57).
If U is not a maximal solution, then there exists another boundedsolution V of the diﬀerential
inclusion (57) that is strictly above U at some p ∈ (0,1). Choose ε > 0 such that V (p)−ε > U(p).
We will show that V (p)−ε is the payoﬀ of a public sequential equilibrium, which is a contradiction
since U is the upper boundary.
From the inequality
V ′′(φ) ≥ H(φ,V (φ),V ′(φ)) a.e.
it follows that a measurable selection (a(φ),¯ b(φ)) ∈ Ψ(φ,φ(1 − φ)V ′(φ)) exists such that






) ≤ 0, (58)
for almost every φ ∈ (0,1).






with initial condition φ0 = p.
Let (Wt) be the unique strong solution of
dWt = r(Wt − g(a(φt),¯ b(φt)))dt + V ′(φt)γ(a(φt),¯ b(φt),φt)dZn
t ,
with initial condition W0 = V (p) − ε.
Consider the process Dt = Wt − V (φt). It follows from Itˆ o’s formula for diﬀerentiable
functions with absolutely continuous derivatives that:
dDt
dt











and since D0 = −ε < 0 it follows that Wt ց −∞.
Let τ be the ﬁrst time that (φt,Wt) hits the graph of U. Consider a strategy proﬁle / belief
process that coincides with (at,¯ b,φt) up to time τ and, after that, follows a public sequential
equilibrium of the game with prior φτ with value U(φτ). It is immediate from Theorem 1 that
the strategy proﬁle / belief process constructed is a sequential equilibrium that yields the large
player payoﬀ V (p) − ε > U(p), a contradiction.
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In this supplemental appendix, we will show that in the reputation games from Section 7 of
Faingold and Sannikov (2007) a sequential equilibrium is guaranteed to exist as long as public
randomization is allowed. For simplicity, we will consider the case of ﬁnite action sets A and B
(allowing for mixed strategies) and we will normalize σ to unity. We will maintain Condition 1
throughout.




progressively measurable w.r.t. (Ft). Given a publicly randomized strategy proﬁle (πt), the
public signal X follows:
dXt = µ(πt)dt + dZt,





A deviation for the large player is a progressively measurable process (αt) with values in the
set of functions from A×B into A. A deviation for the small players is deﬁned similarly. Given
a publicly randomized strategy π and a deviation α, write:
πα
t (a,¯ b) = πt(αt(a,¯ b),¯ b),
for all (a,¯ b) ∈ A×B. A publicly randomized strategy is sequentially rational for the large player


















￿ ￿ θ = n
￿
where the expectation on the LHS is taken w.r.t. to the measure generated by π and the one on
the right is taken w.r.t. to the measure generated by πα. Given a belief process (φt), sequential
rationality for the small players is deﬁned analogously. A publicly randomized sequential equi-
librium is a publicly randomized strategy (πt) together with a belief process (φt) such that (πt)
is sequentially rational w.r.t. (φt), and (φt) is consistent with (πt).
Notice that we allow for a rich set of deviations in which the relabeling can depend on the
recommendations to the opponent. Otherwise we would get correlated equilibrium instead of
sequential equilibrium with public randomization.
1For each φ ∈ [0,1] and β ∈ Rd, let N(φ,β) ⊂ ∆A × ∆B denote the set of Nash equilibria of
the static game in which the normal type has payoﬀs given by g(a,¯ b) + βµ(a,¯ b) and the small
players have payoﬀs given by (1 − φ)h(a,bi,¯ b) + φh(a∗,bi,¯ b).
We now state the appropriate modiﬁcation of Theorem 1 for publicly randomized strategies.
Theorem. A publicly randomized proﬁle (πt) together with a belief process (φt) is a public
sequential equilibrium with continuation values (Wt) for the normal type if and only if
(a) (Wt) is a bounded process that satisﬁes
dWt = r(Wt − g(πt))dt + rβt   (dXt − µ(πt) dt) (1)
for some process β ∈ L∗,
(b) belief process (φt) follows
dφt = γ(πt,φt) (dXt − µφt(πt) dt), and (2)
(c) strategy (πt) satisﬁes the incentive constraints πt ∈ coN(φt,βt).
The proof is a straightforward modiﬁcation of Theorem 1 from Faingold and Sannikov (2007)
and will be omitted.
We shall now redeﬁne the correspondence Ψ from Section 6 to allow for public randomization:
Ψ(φ,z) =
n
π ∈ ∆(A × ∆B) : π ∈ coN
￿
φ,z (µ(a∗,marg∆(B) π) − µ(π))/r
￿o
.
Note that Ψ(φ,z) is connected for all (φ,z).







|γ(π,φ)|2 : π ∈ Ψ(φ,φ(1 − φ)u′)
￿
for all (φ,u,u′) ∈ [0,1] × R2.
We will now show that a publicly randomized sequential equilibrium exists whenever Con-
dition 1 is satisﬁed.1 First, the lemma below shows that the diﬀerential inclusion
U′′(φ) ∈ Γ(φ,U(φ),U′(φ)) a.e. (3)
has a bounded solution U. Therefore, since Ψ is connected-valued, by the Intermediate Value







and hence, by an argument similar to the penultimate paragraph of the proof of Theorem 3, we
conclude that a sequential equilibrium in publicly randomized strategies exists.
1Condition 3 is redundant, for here we work in the ﬁnite action setup.
2Before turning to the existence lemma we note that, by a straightforward extension of Lem-
mas 3 and 4 to the public randomization setup we have the following quadratic growth condition
for Γ: given any closed interval I ⊂ (0,1) there exists C > 0 such that
sup |Γ(φ,u,u′)| ≤ C(1 + |u′|2)
for all (φ,u,u′) ∈ I × [g,¯ g] × R.
Lemma. A bounded solution of the diﬀerential inclusion (3) exists.
Proof. In ﬁve steps:
STEP 1 (Existence away from 0 and 1): Given any closed interval [p,q] contained in (0,1), the
diﬀerential inclusion has a C2 solution on [p,q] that stays in the set of feasible payoﬀs. This
follows from an existence theorem for boundary value problems for second-order diﬀerential
inclusions that satisfy a certain growth condition, called the Nagumo condition, which is
implied by our quadratic growth condition. The theorem can be found in Bebernes and
Kelley (1973)
STEP 2 (A priori bounds on derivatives): Given any interval [p,q] ⊂ (0,1) there exists R > 0
such that every solution U : [p,q] → R that stays in the set of feasible payoﬀs on [p,q]
satisﬁes |U′| < R on [p,q]. This can be shown using our quadratic growth condition and an
argument similar to the proof of Lemma 6 from Faingold and Sannikov (2007, Appendix
C.1).
STEP 3 (Extension to (0,1)): For each n, let Un : [1/n,1 − 1/n] → R be a C2 solution of the
diﬀerential inclusion on [1/n,1 − 1/n] and let Rn > 0 denote the corresponding a priori
bound on derivatives from STEP 2. Fix n and consider m ≥ n. The restriction of Um
to [1/n,1 − 1/n] is a solution of the diﬀerential inclusion that stays in the set of feasible
payoﬀs on [1/n,1 − 1/n]. Hence STEP 2 applies and we have |U′
m(φ)| < Rn for all
φ ∈ [1/n,1 − 1/n], which implies a uniform bound on the second derivative U′′
m because
of the growth condition. By the Arzel-Ascoli Theorem, for every n the sequence (Um)m>n
has a sub-sequence that converges in the C1 topology on [1/n,1 − 1/n]. Hence, by a
standard diagonalization argument, there exists a subsequence, which we still call Un, that
converges pointwise to some function U : (0,1) → R. Moreover, on any closed sub-interval
I of (0,1), the convergence takes place in C1(I), i.e., U is C1 and (Un,U′
n) → (U,U′)
uniformly on I.
STEP 4 (Absolute continuity of U′): Note that:
(i) U′
n → U′ pointwise, and
(ii) for every [p,q] ⊂ (0,1), U′
n is Lipschitz continuous on [p,q] uniformly over all n >
max{1/p,1/(1 − q)}. This is because by STEP 2 there exists R > 0 such that for
all n with 1/n < min{p,1 − q} we have |U′
n| ≤ R on [p,q], which implies a uniform
bound on U′′
n by the growth condition.
Therefore, U′ is locally Lipschitz, and hence absolutely continuous.
3STEP 5 (U is a solution): Fix an arbitrary ε > 0 and a φ0 at which U′′ exists. Since Γ is u.h.c.
and (Un,U′
n) → (U,U′) uniformly on a nbd of φ0 (by STEP 3), there exist δ and N > 0
such that for all n ≥ N and all φ ∈ (φ0 − δ,φ0 + δ) we have
Γ(φ,Un(φ),U′
n(φ)) ⊂ Γ(φ0,U(φ0),U′(φ0)) + [−ε,ε].
In particular, for almost all φ ∈ (φ0 − δ,φ0 + δ) and all n ≥ N we have
U′′
n(φ) ∈ Γ(φ0,U(φ0),U′(φ0)) + [−ε,ε]. (4)
On the other hand, for all h > 0 and n ≥ 1 we have
(U′








It then follows from the inclusion (4) and the fact that Γ has convex, closed values that
(U′
n(φ0 + h) − U′
n(φ0))/h ∈ Γ(φ0,U(φ0),U′(φ0)) + [−ε,ε]
for all n ≥ N and |h| < δ. Thus, letting n → ∞ ﬁrst and then h → 0 yields
U′′(φ0) ∈ Γ(φ0,U(φ0),U′(φ0)) + [−ε,ε].
Finally, taking ε to zero yields the desired result.
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